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This thesis presents a set of generational accounts for Singapore, following the 
approach developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1994).  In contrast with the 
US results, Singapore did not show a disproportionately high fiscal burden for the 
Future generation due to the massive net wealth accumulated.  Owning to the extreme 
fiscal prudence of Singapore government, we do not suppose accumulated reserves 
will be unlocked easily.  Therefore our base case is one with zero net wealth.   With a 
self-funded pension and limited medical benefits, we show that the majority of 
benefits receivable are actually indirect; this suggests that under the backdrop of 
population ageing, Singapore is confronted with the dual task of expenditure 
containment and building a comprehensive social support network. With normal 
spending pattern, our results confirms that 50% of NIIC is sufficient to impose no net 
burden on Future generation.  However with increased spending in education and 
health, we need 50% of NIIC and receipts from land sales to impose no net burden on 
Future generation.  This confirms that capital receipts as an imperative source of 
fiscal cushion is not exaggerated.  In addition, this also showed that even without 
dipping into accumulated reserves, there are ample rooms for more social support for 
aged residents and further reduction of income taxes if capital income is capitalized 
upon prudently.  Immigration, biased towards young people, can be a potential source 
to alleviate to pressure of ageing population.  Lastly, GA is also shown to be sensitive 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
One of the most important characteristics of Singapore’s government is ‘small 
and lean’.  The most direct measurement is total government spending in relation to 
the size of the economy (GDP).  Currently, total government expenditure has 
averaged around 16% of GDP over the past five years (FY2001 to FY2005) and in 
FY2006, it is at about 14%; while most Asian countries range from 15 to 30%.  The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, on the 
other hand, tend to have a greater ratio (30% to 55% of GDP), mainly due to the 
higher expenditure in Social Security System.  (Budget Highlights 2007)   
 
In Expenditure Highlight for FY2006 to FY2010, government has committed 
its expenditure to mainly two areas: building capabilities for the future and 
strengthening the social security system.  Building capabilities include further 
development in public infrastructure, additional investment in Singapore’s Research 
and Development (R&D) capabilities through the National Research Foundation and 
continued commitment in education not only in the conventional areas of pre-work 
education but also placing new emphasis on post-work education to make learning a 
life-long endeavor.  Strengthening the Social Security system places emphasis in 
maintaining retirement adequacy and short-term assistance packages for low-income 
households. 
   
Although these spending goals seem diverse, we could nevertheless 
understand the motivation as a measure towards continued growth in the face of aging 
population.  The demographic transition of aging population as a consequence of 
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decreasing fertility and mortality poses new challenges to Singapore.  This 
demographic transition increasingly put severe pressure on government budget as the 
elderly people as a group becomes prominent; and resources have to be diverted 
towards providing for them.  This is complicated by the realization that expenditure 
on the elderly is almost exclusively consumption in nature, in that it does not 
appreciably affect the future productive capacity of the economy.  Thus, government 
is faced not only with the traditional aim of building capabilities for growth but also 
new commitment towards the aged citizens as a group.  Consequently, even if 
Singapore’s expenditure presently stands at a respectable 14% of GDP, our changing 
demographic landscape presents an inherent upward pressure in government 
expenditure.  Faced with similar challenges internationally, there is a growing 
awareness that present fiscal policy has longer-term impacts.  This has prompted a 
wide range of research to incorporate inter-temporal effect of present policy on future 
generations. 
 
Besides inter-temporal effects, to better understand the financing challenges of 
aging population on the public institutions, there is a need to incorporate the 
prevalence of private intergenerational transfers.  The burden of aging population on 
public system thus depends on both public and private intergenerational transfers; and 
their importance in relativity.  Therefore researchers have recognized that to better 
realize their somewhat conflicting aims of achieving both efficiency in spending (or 
cutting spending) and adequacy for the elderly, aging research has to include both 
private and public intergenerational transfers.       
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This thesis hopes to contribute to better understanding of government fiscal 
policy by building generational accounts (GA) for Singapore.  In Chapter Two, we 
begin by discussing the methodology of GA.  (Auerbach et al., 1994)  From Chapter 
Three to Chapter Six, we present the empirical application of the methodology 
presented in Chapter Two. Lastly in Chapter Seven, we present our GA results.  Even 
though this thesis covers only public intergenerational transfer, both public and 
private intergenerational transfers are nevertheless intimately interconnected and 
explicable only by reference to the whole.   
 
1.2 PROGRESS IN PUBLIC INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS 
An early critique of short-term budget focused on the omission of an unfunded 
Social Security liability was first put forth by Feldstein in 1974.  Summers (1981), 
Chamley (1981) and Kotlikoff (1979) showed that in a dynamic macroeconomic 
context under the neoclassical framework of rational agents facing life-cycle 
optimization on consumption and saving, deficit accounting is an inappropriate 
measure of the long term stance of fiscal policy because policies that generate the 
same set of reported deficits may differ significantly in terms of intergenerational 
redistribution.  Following that, a survey on traditional deficit indicators by Blejer and 
Cheasty (1991) showed convergence to this similar opinion.  
 
Kotlikoff (1986, 1988) furthered the progress of this observation by pointing 
out the arbitrary nature of conventional deficit accounting; yearly deficits failed to 
take into the account the long term and dynamic financial implication of present fiscal 
policy.  This is however imperative if economic agents are making decision based on 
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lifecycle perspective.  The attempt to incorporate inter-temporal budget constraint has 
prompted the development of generational accounting (GA).  
 
GA has many applications in the world.  In the US, Auerbach et al. (1994) 
concluded that GA describes not only the burdens that fiscal policy place on different 
generations, but also the changes in policy needed to alter the distribution of such 
burdens.  The US generational accounting shows that to achieve the goal of 
stabilizing lifetime tax rates of future generations of Americans, it requires much 
more significant sacrifice by current generations than what they realize.  In Gokhale 
et al. (2000), under the latest economic and demographic assumptions, US fiscal 
policy remains generationally imbalance, although at a slightly smaller magnitude 
than the results published earlier.  In 2000, Auerbach and Oreopoulos incorporated 
fiscal effect of immigration into GA and found that immigration cannot alleviate the 
fiscal imbalance caused by increasing aging population in USA. 
 
In Sweden, (Hagemann & Christoph, 1997) GA results shows that the 
sustained implementation of budgetary consolidation measures, adopted since 1994, 
have significantly improved the intergenerational burden on future generation.  This 
was not captured by traditional budget deficit.  Such improvements are however not 
sufficient to prevent future generations from facing large net tax payment. In 
Denmark, (Jensen, 1997) GA showed that this is a ‘classic’ welfare state, given both 
the size and structure of its public sector.  Under such a fiscal set-up, Danish future 
generation is likely to face a higher net tax burden than present newborns.  In UK, 
(Cardarellis et al., 2000) GA showed that health-care spending will be a critical cost 
containment item in the UK Budget.  Under the base case scenario, where health care 
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expenditure is allowed to grow modestly, results show that imbalance in UK is small 
compared to other OECD countries.  However, under an alternative scenario where 
there is increased health care expenditure, they show that achieving generational 
balance will require a ‘much stronger medicine’.    
 
Apart from assessing present fiscal policy inter-temporally, GA’s application 
has been broadened to assess the impact of a major reform in the public pension 
institution.  In Spain (Bonin et al., 2001), GA is used to examine the intergenerational 
impact of the Spanish public pension system after the 1997 Pension Reform Act.    
They find that the new legal setting could leave future generations with liabilities as 
high as 176% of 1996 GDP.  In alternative reform scenario, (holding a pay-as-you-go 
setting) a further improvement to tax-benefit linkage in line with the Toledo 
Agreement proposals is shown to yield a more balanced outcome, than an increase in 
retirement age or an expansion of public subsidies financed through indirect taxes.   
Finally, moving to a partially funded system will help restore the intergenerational 
balance.  In UK, similar application is also seen in Cardarelli et al. (2000) where they 
showed the impact of the government’s Green Paper on pension.  Their results show 
that the proposals in the Green Paper will marginally increase the tax rise needed to 
ensure inter-temporal equity, and slightly worsen generational imbalance.   
 
GA is also applicable to many country specific features.  Take for example 
Korea and Germany, the impacts of reunification on inter-temporal fiscal balances are 
also discussed.  In Germany (Gokhale et al., 1995), a fully developed GA study based 
on post-unification public sector budget for the year 1992 is built.  Net tax payments 
from the East and West are distinguished.  This laid the foundation of constructing 
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region specific GA for Germany.  In Korea, (Auerbach, Chun & Yoo, 2004) GA is 
used to assess the fiscal impact for the hypothetical situation of Korean reunification.    
In early unification, a large increase in fiscal burden is observed for most current and 
future generations of South Koreans.  Compared to Germany Reunification, the fiscal 
impact of unification is greater for Korea due to wider gap in productivity.  The large-
scale fiscal burden in South Korea comes mainly from the steep increase in social 
welfare for North Koreans rather than from direct reconstruction cost of the North 
Korean economic system.   
 
Most OECD countries showed a serious generational imbalance.  However for 
Australia (Ablett, 1996) and New Zealand (Auerbach et al., 1997), GA results show 
that the future generations do not have to bear a disproportionately high fiscal burden.  
Auerbach et al. (1997) finds that behind New Zealand’s projected budget surpluses, 
there is a sound fiscal system.  Even under the base case scenario, which entails 
substantial short-run tax reductions, the burden on future generation is projected to 
fall slightly below that in current newborns.      
 
1.3 TWO OTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Another area of research focuses on the question: whether there are significant 
intergenerational inequities and whether they are changing over time.  (Becker & 
Murphy, 1988; Preston, 1984).  One of the approaches focuses on the magnitude and 
direction of intergenerational transfers, resulting from the interplay between the 
relative political strength of the elderly group and other age groups.  (Preston, 1984) 
An alternative approach offered by studies, such as Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), 
Barro (1974) and Becker and Tomes (1976) advocated that intergenerational transfers 
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are the outcomes of cooperative private and social implicit contracts guided by 
efficiency concerns and altruism.   
 
A third area of research addresses the concern of the effect of 
intergenerational transfers on savings, consumptions and economic growth. (Feldstein 
(1974, 1996) and Gale (1998).  This group of study focuses mainly on the evaluation 
of the existing transfer system, make recommendations for reforms and analyze 
possible future reforms.  Feldstein (1974) uses an extended life cycle model to 
analyze the impacts of social security on the individual’s simultaneous decision about 
retirement and savings.  His econometric study, using an estimated time series of 
‘Social Security wealth’ indicates that social security depresses personal saving by 30 
to 50%.  Gale (1998) examines the extent to which households offset pension wealth 
with reductions in other wealth.  He showed that systematic econometric biases imply 
that the estimated effect in previous studies are smaller than the true offset and may 
even have the wrong sign.  New empirical studies that do not correct for the biases 
generate little offset between pensions and other wealth.  Estimates for the corrected 
bias showed a substantially greater offset than in most previous studies.    
 
The US social security, in particular, has been the focus of an enormous 
amount of literature.  (Feldstein & Samwick, 2001; Krueger & Kubler, 2002)  
Feldstein and Samwick (2001) present several alternative Social Security reform 
options in which the projected level of benefits for every future cohort is as high or 
higher than the benefits projected in the current law.  These are achieved without 
increments in taxes.  Each option combines the current pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
system with an investment based retirement account (PRA).  Assets in PRA can be 
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bequeathed if individual dies before retirement age.  Krueger and Kubler (2002) 
studies an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete 
markets to assess if the introduction of an unfunded social security system can lead to 
Pareto improvement.  Their results show that, firstly, abstracting from the crowding 
out effect of Social Security on the aggregate stock in general equilibrium, the 
introduction of social security does represent a Pareto improvement if households are 
both fairly risk-averse and fairly willing to substitute consumption inter-temporally.   
Secondly, the severity of the capital crowding out effect in general equilibrium 
overturns these gains for degrees of risk aversion and inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution commonly used in the literature.   
 
      
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION 
Following literature review in chapter one, we start to introduce Generational 
Accounts (GA) here.  This thesis follows the GA methodology first established by 
Auerbach et. al. (1991 and 1994) and is then substantiated by Auerbach, Kotlikoff and 
Leibfritz (1999).     
 
Before we actually start to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of generational 
accounts, it is useful to start with the definition of some frequently used terms in this 
thesis.  The words ‘generation’ or ‘cohort’ refers to either a male or female person of a 
specific age.  Consequently, generational accounts is defined as the amount of net tax an 
ordinary member of each age group can be expected to pay for his/her remaining lifetime 
expressed in present value.  Net tax is the difference between government tax receipts 
and government expenditure benefits.  Present value (for today or any time frame chosen 
as the basis of reference) expresses the worth of future streams of net payments in today’s 
valuation; as if the net payments over time are paid as a lump sum today.    
 
Why express in net figures?  The simple reason is that there are countless of ways 
to the label every dollar the government gets from the people.  This will in turn introduce 
ambiguity in the measurement of governmental deficit.  Take for example, the 
government issues a bond of $1which promises to pay back $1.05 in the next year.  We 
could label $1 as government borrowing and $1.05 as paying back principal plus interest 
in the following year.  Alternatively, we could also label the same $1 as taxing the citizen 
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and $1.05 a year later as transfer to the citizen.  Adding more to the complication, we 
could also label taxing $5 and transferring $4 in the first year then transferring $1.05 in 
the second year.  In short, by changing the mode of labeling, it is difficult to measure debt 
and deficit in an economically meaningful way.  (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff; 
1994).  However, by using the net concept, we can by-pass the problem because 
independent of labeling, the net amount we get for the first year is always $1, similarly 
for the second year we need to payout $1.05.    
 
2.2 CONSTRUCTION OF GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
Generational accounts rely heavily on government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint.  The inter-temporal budget constraint requires the present value of 
government’s consumption and its initial indebtedness (or a negative number if 
government’s official debt is more than covered by her marketable assets) to be equal to 
the net tax payments (in present value) from existing and future generations.  This 
however does not imply that the government debt will be paid off; the only requirement 
is for this debt to be serviced through tax payments by either existing and/or future 
generation.     


















               (2.1) 
 
            A                     +            B                     =            C                +           D 
Present value (PV) of          PV of net tax                PV of all future       government 
remaining net tax        +      payments of          =     government       +     net 




2.2.1 Understanding each term  
In this section, we explain in detail what each term in Equation 2.1 means.    
 









Firstly, each term N t,k is the generational account for an ordinary individual in 
time t (where t is base year of reference) born in the year k.  The first term in A is Nt,t 
(s=0) which is the generational account for newly born cohort (age 0); the last term is Nt, 
t-D  (s = D) which is the generational accounts for the oldest generation alive in year t; 
born in year t-D.  Under our MATLAB GA program, we are able to simulate gender and 
age specific (in yearly intervals1) GA from ‘0’ to a maximum of  (D = ) ‘100’ years old. 
Since our year of reference is  (t = ) 2004, GA for cohorts born at (age ‘0’) and before 
2004 will be calibrated under A.  GA for cohorts born after 2004 will be calibrated under 
B. 
 
We should be cautious when we interpret A.  A is the present value of net tax 
payments for existing generation, therefore, it does not include the lifetime net tax 
payment for these generations; only remaining net tax payments are included for 




) for a valid 





                                                
1 However for a salient presentation, we present GA in decennial intervals in chapter seven.  
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                                                       ∑ begins here 
                                                                              
   Current generation (born)                                                                                                          
          e.g. Nt,  t-D                                              
                                                                       Discount to 
  
 
 k             Discount to           
 
                                                                                                         future generation (born)     
e.g. Nt, t+h ; where k=t+h                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                            ∑ begins here 
 
 
We have established above that generational accounts are simply a set of values 
given by Nt,k.  Equation 2.2 expresses a set of GA as a function of average net tax 
payment Ts, k  and Ps, k , the number of surviving members of the cohort.  As the same 
equation applies for all cohorts, both current and future, both will be explained together 













,,, )1(                                     (2.2) 
 
From Equation 2.2, Ts, k stands for the projected average net tax payment to the 
government in year ‘s’ by an ordinary member born in year ‘k’.  Ps, k is the number of 
surviving members of the generation in the year ‘s’ born in the year ‘k’.  (1+r)t-s simply 
expresses each generational account in present value.  To understand why s = max(t, k) 
 time         t 






  age ‘0’ 
Age 
Age 
Median age is older 
than time ‘t’ 
Population distribution 
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we can examine Figure 2.1.  For existing cohorts (expressed above as e.g. Nt, t-D), born 
before the year ‘t’ (so t > k as k = t - D), summation starts only at year ‘t’.  This is the 
remaining net tax payable for the rest of their lifetime.  This amount is then discounted to 
year ‘t’.  In contrast, for future generation (expressed above as e.g. Nt, t+h), they are born 
after the base year ‘t’ therefore k > t (as k = t + h).  Therefore summation will start in 
year ‘k’ and it is also expressed in year ‘t’ dollars.  For t = k, this is the age 0 cohort and 
we have established this above as Nt, t.   
 
Therefore for a 25-year-old female (k = 1979), her GA (remaining lifetime net tax 
payment) at 2004 dollars is the summation of her discounted yearly net tax contribution 
up to the year 2079 (k + D = 1979 + 100).  
 









 B adds together the GAs for all future generations (born after base year 2004) 
expressed in present value.    Consequently, B is the aggregate payment (in PV) that all 
future generations need to pay after current generations paid their share of net tax 
payments (PV) in A.  In Auerbach et, al. (1991 and 1994) GA methodology, B is 
obtained as a residue after determining A.  From B, we need to determine the average per 
person lifetime net tax payment (in PV) for each of the future generations.  The 
assumption: the average per person lifetime net tax payment expressed in PV between 
each successive generation is only differed by the productivity growth rate (‘g’) is used; 
thereby effectively making lifetime payment a constant share of lifetime income.   This 
allows for the expression of all future generations’ GA in terms of a representative person 
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born in the year immediately after the base year i.e. if the base year is 2004, the GA for 
future generations will be that of a representative person born in 2005.  Average lifetime 
net tax payment in PV for future generation will then be comparable to that of the age ‘0’ 
cohort after controlling for growth adjustment. (Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz, 1999) 
 
The assumption that GA for two consecutive future generations stays identical 
except for productivity growth rate ‘g’ adjustment will give the following mathematical 
presentation: (Bonin, 1999)2 
GA t+j, t+j = (1 + g) j-1 GA t+1, t+1                                   (2.3) 
Where: 
1< j < ∞  
 
As mentioned in previous paragraph, B is obtained as a residue after determining 
A.   Consequently, it is clear that future generation will have to bear the burden of all 
unpaid debts (once the existing generations paid their share in A) incurred by the 
government.  A generational imbalance happens when the lifetime net tax faced by future 
generation exceed that of current generation (age 0 cohort).  This also goes to show that 
such a fiscal policy under current conditions of the base year may not be sustainable as 
there is a limit to the size of fiscal imbalance.  If such a problem is not rectified early, 
government may run into the danger of Ponzi financing (means to finance debts with 
more debts) and such a system will ultimately collapse under the weight of accumulated 
debts.   
                                                
2 pp 54 
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After covering the prominent components of Equation 2.1, we return to discuss 
the features of this inter-temporal budget constraint.  The inter-temporal budget constraint 
embodies two prominent concepts.  First, is the concept of present value (PV), which is 
defined as the worth of future streams of net payments in today’s valuation; as if the net 
payments over time are paid as a lump sum today.  Thus, PV allows us a basis of 
comparison between monetary values over time.   Second, Equation 2.1 includes the 
concept of zero sum constraint, that is, nothing comes for free; whatever that has been 
spent, has to be billed to someone.  Take for example, if the government decides to incur 
a one time spending to build a new highway (see Equation 2.1, C increases), for the 
equation to remain balanced, either present generations and/or future generation has to 
pay more taxes, ceteris paribus (so A and/or B has to increase).  In addition, 
intergenerational redistribution can also be illuminated in Equation 2.1.  Supposing in 
2004, the government decides to cut income tax for a period of 5 years; after which, tax 
rate will increase to make up for this tax cut.  If we assume that the incidence of income 
tax falls mostly on age groups 30 to 39; with its peak at age group 30 to 34, we will know 
that tax cut for 5 years will benefit ages 30 to 39.   However, younger age groups like 20 
to 24 (or any age before 24) and future generation are like to suffer as a result of tax cut 
in 2004. 
 
Generational accounts essentially address the question: if current policy is to 
remain in place for current generations, how much net taxes (expressed in PV) are they 
required to pay.  If we re-arrange Equation 2.1 in a way that B = C + D – A, we will 
obtain the amount of net taxes future generation (B) has to pay, as a residual term, all else 
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remains equal.  Equation 2.1 also demonstrates the simultaneity problem: that we cannot 
determine the fiscal burden being imposed on future generations (B) without knowing the 
future path of government spending (C) however, C cannot be obtained when B remain 
unknown.  Therefore to overcome this dilemma, we have to make some assumptions 
about the future paths of these variables (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1994).    
 
2.3 PRIVATE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
 The private budget constraint (BC) is worth a mention here.  It is because, a 
policy that is considered to be deficit neutral can actually have some implication from 
generational accounts’ point of view; consequently, the macroeconomic impact of such a 
policy can also be illuminated.  Thus the role of private BC serves as a useful tool to 
facilitate our discussion.   
 
Private BC will be introduced first; followed by an example to illustrate our point.  
For a generation born in year ‘k’, the [remaining (for existing cohorts: k < t)] lifetime 
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The lifetime private BC for each generation says that the PV of his consumption 
(Cs, k) and private net intergenerational transfers (Is, k) must equal to his current (at time 
‘t’) net wealth ( pktW , ) plus the PV value of his labor earnings ( Es, k ) minus PV of net tax 
payment (Nt,k).  (which is our generational account for an individual at time ‘t’; born at 
time ‘k’).   
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 Supposing the government decides to permanently increase goods and service tax 
(GST) and decrease individual income tax to make up for this short fall; such that we 
have an equal revenue switch scenario.  From conventional deficit accounting point of 
view, a revenue neutral policy as such has no impact on the budget.  This however has a 
pronounced generational implication.  Firstly, as will be seen from Table 3.23, we know 
that individual income tax is bore heavily by ages 30 to 39.  If we are to examine age 
groups 30 to 39 from a gender specific perspective (from the results of Chapter 3, we 
produce Table 2.2 here to aid in discussion), it is clear that the incidence of tax fall more 
on men than on women.  In addition, comparing the incidence of taxation between 
income tax and GST, it is fairly clear that GST is paid by a wider range of age groups.   
Consequently, such a policy of GST increase compensated by an decrease in income tax 
will mostly benefiting the young and middle age men while all ages of women and old 
men will de adversely affected.  
TABLE 2.2: AGE AND GENDER SPECIFIC INCOME TAX AND GST 
Age Income Tax (S$) Male Female GST (S$) Male Female 
15-19 0 0 0 92.90 94.92 90.87 
20-24 84.81 78.79 90.83 727.78 676.08 779.47 
25-29 1,251.90 1414.67 1089.13 1,404.56 1587.17 1221.94 
30-34 2,318.38 2880.18 1756.58 1,687.23 2096.09 1278.37 
35-39 2,287.50 2971.13 1603.87 1,606.04 2086.01 1126.07 
40-44 2,004.45 2552.88 1456.02 1,441.84 1836.34 1047.34 
45-49 1,516.49 1933.03 1099.95 1,341.50 1709.97 973.03 
50-54 960.02 1273.52 646.52 1,050.93 1394.12 707.73 
55-59 263.59 373.41 153.77 595.52 843.63 347.40 
60-64 0 0 0 201.67 302.00 101.33 
65-69 0 0 0 55.18 86.33 24.04 
70-74 0 0 0 7.75 12.07 3.44 
≥ 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 




 When a woman loses from this policy, her generational account will increase as 
she now pays more net tax.  (Conversely for young and middle age men)  To keep 
Equation 2.4 balance, one of the options is to translate it into a smaller lifetime 
consumption in PV.  Given the evidence that the marginal propensity to consume 
remaining lifetime resources will rise with age (Auerbach et al., 1992), this policy will 
decrease the consumption of the elder female more than it does for the younger female.  
Overall perspective, it is likely that the decline in consumption among the elders of both 
genders will more than offset the rise in consumption by the young and middle age men.  
Consequently, overall consumption may actually be retarded by this policy.  This 
example clearly illustrated our point that what was considered neutral in conventional 
deficit accounting actually has an immense amount of generational impact.  Thus, 
without the accurate dynamics offered by generational accounts, it is difficult to assess 
the true macroeconomic impact of any given policy.   
 
2.4 LIMITATIONS OF GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
GA with its inter-temporal view enables one to analysis whether a government’s 
current selection of fiscal parameters is sustainable in the long term.  It also allows for the 
illumination of inter-generational redistribution brought about by either current 
government activity or intended policy reforms in the presence of demographic transition 
to aging population.  In this sense, GA is superior to traditional budget deficit measure.  
However, GA is not without its limitations.  GA limitations could be categorized into two 
main parts.  The first set of limitations arises from typical problems faced by literatures 
that use conditional projection and the second is a methodology issue.   
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One major limitation of GA arises from uncertainty.  GA uses long-term 
population and fiscal projection to obtain calculations for its future generation.  However, 
common to many long-term economic analyses, the problem of uncertainty and the need 
to use assumptions plague these quantitative results.  In GA’s case, different assumptions 
on population, economic performances, productivity growth rate and discount rate can 
vary GA results substantially.  Such freedom in parameter choices gives room for 
misspecification and manipulation and is more accentuated in the designing of alternative 
cases than base case simulation (where it is more restricted by methodology).  This is a 
typical problem plaguing analysis of conditional projection and cannot be solve by 
scientific reasoning. (Bonin, 2001)  In this sense, GA results can only present qualitative 
results even though it is expressed quantitatively.  
 
One example such limitation is the issue of discount rate.  Discount rate in 
economics is used as an indication of cost of waiting.  In GA, discount rate also reflects 
the cost of uncertainty i.e. the risk of losing income by postponing.  However, using 
uniform discount rate throughout implies that all individuals have the same risk aversion.  
This problem is especially glaring when the same discount rate is applied to the net taxes 
of all generations across time.  For example, under the pay-as-you-go system, we know 
that present generations of old people’s claim to their social security benefits is more 
secured compared to future generation’s claim to their prospective benefits because of 
aging population.  However, if robust economic growth were to prevail for future 
generation, they may be wealthier than present generation’s old people thus making them 
more able to take risk.  Therefore under such a setting, there is no reason to assume that 
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different generation will have the same risk aversion.  For a more detailed discussion, 
refer to Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999; pp 37 to 40). 
 
The second set of problem is a methodology issue.  Future generations’ GA is 
obtained as residual (B) after present generations paid their share of net tax (A).  Thus 
Auerbach et. al. (1991, 1994) methodology is also known as the residual approach.  This 
assumption that successive future generations’ GA differ only by a productivity growth 
rate ‘g’ (see Equation 2.3) accounted for its limitation as a too simplistic view to take.  
Such an approach does not “design tax and benefit parameters by future generations 
explicitly” and requires the inter-temporal financing of government activities to be 
distributed equally among future generations. (Bonin, 2001)  Consequently, it does not 
include possibility of incorporating parameters changes that will affect their GA.   Take 
for example, a socio-economic change such as a raise in female labor participation rate 
could potentially lower the required lifetime tax payment for future generations. 
(Berenguer et. al., 1999 quoted in Bonin 2001).  However since the residual method does 
not allow for explicit modelling of future tax and transfer policy, these weights can only 
remain ad hoc. (Raffelhuschen and Walliser, 19993 quoted in Bonin 2001) 
 
Another crucial methodological issue comes from the great diversity in specifying 
tax incidence and the assignment of benefit to specific age groups.  These relative 
profiles need to be age and gender specific in order for the remaining lifetime net tax 
payment for each age cohort to be determined.  However, with the absence of age related 
                                                
3 Article from Generational Accounting around the World edited by Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz 
(1999) pp277 - 298 
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micro data, ambiguities and manipulation can arise.  For a big country with a complex 
fiscal system and many overlapping benefits system, GA could change greatly with an 
exclusion of certain tax or benefit.  Even different allocation of tax and benefits to 
specific age groups can give rise to substantial changes from an inter-temporal 
perspective.   Consequently, one needs to keep this in mind that individual GA results 
will differ greatly depending on how the relative profiles are constructed when comparing 
of base case GA using the same residual approach across countries.  As such, there is a 
need to set a well-defined standard for fiscal indicators.     
 
With regards to the absence of age specific micro level data, the prevailing view 
is that there need to be a well-defined standard in order to coordinate the collection of age 
specific data for the requirements of GA.  (Bonin, 2001) 
 
2.6 APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discussed the methodology for generation accounting.  To apply the 
above methodology empirically, we need to construct three sets of matrices: namely age 
(and gender) specific relative profiles, population projection4 and fiscal projection.  In 
chapter three, we construct age specific relative profile matrices for both male and 
female.  In chapter four, we first construct the life table for Singapore.  This serves as the 
fundamental input for both age and gender specific population projection using the Leslie 
matrices method covered in chapter five.   Lastly, both government expenditure and 
                                                
4 Age and gender specific also: meaning that one projection for each gender, each broken down into age 0, 
1 ,2 ,3 ,…,100+ 
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taxation projection will be built in chapter six.   Chapter seven will discuss the GA 
results. 
   
 
CHAPTER 3: AGE-SPECIFIC BENEFITS & TAXES 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The age-specific benefits and taxes matrices are the first set of inputs for our final 
GA result. These matrices will give a cross-sectional view of government revenue and 
expenditure pattern.  While GA indicates the amount of tax burden bored by each cohort 
relative to the base year cohort, it does not provide detailed examination of individual tax 
and spending component.  The analysis in this chapter will supplement the analysis given 
by the generation accounts.  These age-specific matrices help to identify the age groups 
that are the main tax contributors and the age groups that benefit most out of government 
spending for each tax and benefit component.   
 
3.2  DATA SOURCES 
In this exercise, 2004 is chosen as the reference year.  The age-specific tax and 
expenditure (or benefits from an individual’s point of view) pattern are constructed from 
the Financial Year 2004/05.  Tax receipt figures are complied from “Financial 
Statements”1 which give precise figures with comprehensive breakdowns.  “The Budget 
of the Financial Year 2004/05” from the Accountant-General’s office2 on the other hand 
provides expenditure figures; where breakdown of expenditures by ministries and offices 
are available.  
 
Data sources used to apportion taxes and benefits by age are gathered from 
various government publications.  Generally, figures for education are provided by the 
                                                
1 Financial statement for the financial year 2004/05 Cmd. 7 of 2005 Presented to Parliament by command 
of the president of Republic of Singapore ordered by Parliament to lie upon the table: 1 July 2005  
2 The budget for the financial year 2004/05 from Accountant General’s office Cmd. 3of 2005  
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Ministry of Education (MOE) publication: “Education Statistics Digest 2004”, which are 
downloaded from MOE website.3  Health statistics are available from the Ministry of 
Health website.4  Demographic figures are from the Yearbook of Statistics 2005 
(containing 2004 figures) or Census of population 2000 (Demographics and Household 
& Housing).  With regards to housing, two concurrent sources are particularly valuable. 
They are Public Housing in Singapore: Residents’ Profile & Physical Aspects published 
by the Housing Development Board (HDB).5  The second important source is the Census 
of population 2000, Household and Housing.  Since the census of population is 
conducted only once every 10 years, we assume the structure to remain unchanged over 
the ten years.  Finally, labor and manpower statistics are readily available from the 
publication by the Ministry of Manpower: (2004) Report on Labor Force in Singapore. 6    
 
3.3  METHODOLOGY 
To construct the age-specific matrices, we ask the question: “How much taxes or 
benefits will an ordinary individual (of any specific age) will pay or receive in 2004.”7 
 
3.3.1 Taxes 
Singapore’s revenue structure is very special.  In terms of tax revenue, we can see 
that income tax is the single largest revenue source followed by Goods and Services Tax 
(GST). The breakdown of income tax shows that Corporate Income Tax (CIT) is usually 
                                                
3 www.moe.edu.sg  
4 www.moh.gov.sg  
5 The latest edition is published in 2005 and based on 2003 household surveys.  Thus we assume that there 
is insignificant change over the course of one year. 
6 www.mom.gov.sg downloadable but not printable or library has a copy 
7 A general note of caution, all proportions used should add up to 1. Also all figures after apportioning will 
have to be divided by the number of people in that age group as what we wanted is benefits received and 
taxes paid for each individual of any specific age in 2004.   
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about 6% points higher than Personal Income Tax (PIT).  (See Table 3.1A)  From Table 
3.1B, we observe that tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue is usually about 70%. 
This highlights the significance of capital revenue, i.e. net investment income (NII) and 
receipts from land sales, in our revenue structure.  (Also see Figure 3.2)   However, while 
income tax revenue is rather stable, we note that capital revenue is quite volatile.  (Table 
3.1B) 
TABLE 3.1a: BREAKDOWN OF TAX REVENUE EXPRESSED IN 











tax PIT CIT 
2004 11.1 5.7 5.6 4.5 4.0 10.1 6.0 11.5 17.7 
2005 8.5 5.3 4.9 3.7 3.6 9.5 4.8 10.8 18.3 
2006 7.2 6.6 4.6 3.7 3.9 9.2 4.8 11.0 19.3 
2007 8.8 7.2 5.0 4.1 4.4 12.3 5.3 13.1 21.4 
Source: Author’s computation; raw figures from Budget Highlights FY2007 
Note: 
1. Income tax= PIT + CIT where PIT is Personal income tax and CIT is Corporate income tax 
2. 2004 to 2006 are actual figures while 2007 figures are the official estimates published by the 
Ministry of Finance 
 
TABLE 3.1b: TAX REVENUE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE 
 Income tax Tax revenue Full NII + land 
2004 29.2 76.1 23.9 
2005 29.1 69.5 30.5 
2006 30.3 70.2 29.8 
2007 32.0 75.8 24.2 
Source: Ibid 

































For our purpose, tax structure in Singapore is divided into age specific and non-
age specific categories.  Age specific taxes are namely income tax and asset tax.  Non-
age specific taxes are goods & service tax (GST), motor vehicles, betting, stamp duties, 
capital tax, miscellaneous charges and lastly excise taxes.  Taxes are collected by two 
separate authorities.  All taxes except excise taxes are collected by Inland Revenue 
Authority of Singapore (IRAS); whereas excise taxes come from Singapore Customs.  




3.3.1.1 Income tax 
Income tax is the main revenue source in Singapore.  Income tax includes 
personal income tax and corporate income tax, but there is no published figure on the 
detailed breakdown.  However the Ministry of Finance (MOF) website8 indicates that the 
revenue collected from corporate income tax is about twice that of personal income tax.  
(See Table 3.3)  This is consistent with tax competition to retain talented individuals.  
This is evident from the fact that across time, corporate income tax rate has always been 
higher than personal income tax rate.  (From Tables 3.4 and 3.5)  Indeed this pattern is 
different from most OECD countries, where personal tax reliance is almost twice that of 
corporate income tax.  Consequently, although Singapore has a progressive tax structure, 
its tax brackets are rather low (from Table 3.4).  Hence there is a tradeoff between tax 
competition and domestic equity.  Table 3.4 also shows that over the years, the income 
tax structure has become flatter (i.e. fewer tax brackets).   
 
                                                
8 www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2004/ 
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TABLE 3.3: INCOME TAX BREAKDOWN FOR FY2004/05 
 S$ (Billions) S$ (Billions) 
Corporate Income Tax 6.57  
Personal Income Tax  3.84  
Total Income tax  10.41 
Source: MOF Website: www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2004/ 
 
TABLE 3.4: PERSONAL INCOME TAX BRACKETS OVER TIME 
FOR 2003 TO 2006 
 Chargeable Income Rates (%) 
 S$ 2006 2003-05 
On first 20,000 0 0 
On next 10,000 3.75 4 
On next 10,000 5.75 6 
On next 40,000 8.75 9 
On next 80,000 14.5 15 
On next 160,000 18 19 
above 320,000 21 22 
 
FOR 1997 TO 2002 
 Chargeable Income Rates (%) 
 S$ 2002 1997-2001 
On first 7,500 0 2 
On next 12,500 3 5 
On next 15,000 6 8 
On next 15,000 9 12 
On next 25,000 12 16 
On next 25,000 15 20 
On next 50,000 18 22 
On next 50,000 21 23 
On next 200,000 24 26 
Above  400,000 26 28 
 
TABLE 3.5: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES OVER TIME 
Year of Assessment Tax Rate (%) 










1986 & before 40 
Note: A company is taxed at a flat rate on its chargeable income. 
Source: IRAS website; http//www.iras.gov.sg/ESVPortal/ct/pfv/ct_b.2.2_what+are+the+tax_rates 
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Since we do not have micro-data, we need to construct an age-specific data set, 
given the existing data.  In the construction of age specific tax, we apportion personal 
income tax over the ages of 15 to 74 years old.  This is because the entry into labor force 
is officially set at the age of 15 and retires at 62.9  We also assume that individuals can 
hold part-time jobs until the age of 74.  Apportionment fractions are calculated using tax 
payable by each age group, which is based on total10 (not average) yearly income by age 
group.  The reason is because employment rate by age group should be accounted for.  In 
the apportionment, we take into consideration labor productivity in terms of wage growth 
and participation rates.  Age groups 25 to 55 not only have higher income than other age 
groups (thereby paying more income taxes); this contribution is further magnified by the 
fact that labor force participations from 25 to 49 are higher than other age groups.  (See 
Table 3.6)  Therefore these two factors should be taken into account simultaneously when 
apportioning income tax contribution.   
 
TABLE 3.6: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME BY AGE 
Age groups Employment (number) Average monthly Income (S$) 
15-19 42,289 959.14 
20-24 254,612 1781.76 
25-29 397,430 2899.36 
30-34 353,341 3639.29 
35-39 308,207 3708.67 
40-44 263,959 3590.43 
45-49 205,063 3336.58 
50-54 143,276 2935.25 
55-59 66,165 2208.48 
60-64 25,792 1215.16 
65-69 15,961 583.35 
70-74 8,720 242.38 
Source: For employment figures: Census of population 2000 (Economic Characteristics) Table 1 
              For average monthly income: author’s own computation   
 
                                                
9 Official age to enter workforce is set at 15 whereas the retirement age is set by Retirement Act at 62  
10 Therefore, total monthly income (from Census of population 2000; household and housing table 63) is 
obtained by multiplying average monthly income by employment from each age group. Yearly income is 
monthly income multiplied by 12. 
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3.3.1.2 Property tax 
Property tax comes under the overall heading of asset tax.  Under asset taxes there 
is an estate tax that we ignored because of its insignificant contribution.  (Refer to Table 
3.7)  From property tax, care should also be taken to extract residential property tax 
contribution from total contribution.11  (Also refer to table 3.7) 
 
TABLE 3.7 BREAKDOWNS FOR ASSET TAX 
 (S$’000) (S$’000) (S$’000) (S$’000) 
HDB 51,325    
Residential 287,125    
Commercial 500,220    
Industrial 441,624    
Others 228,301    
Private Properties  1,508,598   
Statutory Boards  192,972   
Other Properties  595   
Property Tax   1,701,608  
Estate Duty   356,611  
Asset Tax    2,058,220 
Source: Financial statement for the financial year 2004/05 Cmd. 7 of 2005 
 







                                                
11 Detailed breakdown can be obtained from IRAS Annual Report 2005 (containing 2004 figures) 
 30 
We assume that home ownership occurs at the time of marriage.  The average age 
for marriage is 30 years old.  We allow for ownership of property until 65 after which, it 
is assumed that they generally relinquish ownership of present housing and move into a 
smaller unit in preparation for old age.  This timeline is lengthened until 65 to allow for 
the trend of downgrading commonly observed among older citizens.  From Table 3.8, it 
is evident that in 2003, higher proportion of elderly population tends to occupy 1, 2, 3-
Room flats (40.5%) compared to overall HDB population (24.8%).  However, over the 
last five years, the proportion of elderly living in smaller flats has declined from 47.8% to 
40.5%; while the majority of the population regardless of age resides in 4-Room flats.    
 
TABLE 3.8: ELDERLY POPULATION BY FLAT TYPE 
 









1-Room  5.2  1.8  4.6  1.1  
2-Room  6.8 47.8 3.3 32.9 6.3 40.5 2.2 24.8 
3-Room  35.8  27.8  29.6  21.5  
4-Room  32.0  39.0  36.4  41.3  
5-Room  15.9  20.4  17.7  25.2  
executive  4.3  7.7  5.4  8.7  
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0               
Total N 194,791 2,703,109 217,568 2,844,686 
Source: Public Housing in Singapore: Social Aspects & the Elderly p90 table 5.2 
 
Property tax apportioning is age specific.  As we commonly observed, at the age 
of 25, peoples with smaller family and income are generally contented with their housing 
situation.  However, as income increases and family size enlarges, they go through a 
series of upgrading (peaked at around late 30s to 40s).  Subsequently, the reverse trend 
occurs at around 50s and they go through another series of downgrading.  (Refer to Table 
3.9)  We however, could not get age specific housing arrangements.  Therefore, such 
information is built using the following two sets of information.   Firstly, we need data on 
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the number of people living in 1 and 2-room flats, 3-room flats, 4-room flats, 5-room & 
executive apartments, private condominium and landed property12 in 2004.  Then the 
expectation of upgrading and downgrading is factored in using preferred housing 
arrangements by age group.13  (Refer to Table 3.9)   
 
Take for example, from Census of Population 2000;14 we have calculated that the 
proportion of people living in 1 and 2-Room flats is 5%.  Within this 5%, 3.6% comes 
from the age group below 30 years old, 9.0% comes from 30-34 years old and so on.  
Thus by multiplying 5% to each of the proportion by age group (e.g. 0.05*0.036 = 
0.0018); we are able to breakdown the proportion of people living in each living 
arrangement by age groups.  For detailed calculation, refer to Table 3.10.   
 
TABLE 3.9: PREFERRED HOUSING & FLAT TYPES TO MOVE TO BY AGE 
GROUPS OF RESIDENTS 














Private Others Overall 
Below 30  3.6 6.0 10.6 8.1 0.0 11.9 4.7 8.9 
30-34  9.0 10.1 18.0 23.25 0.0 25.2 2.9 18.0 
35-39  3.7 13.2 24.6 24.7 5.8 24.9 17.9 20.5 
40-44  6.8 15.4 16.2 16.65 0.0 19.9 9.4 15.9 
45-49  37.9 17.3 13.0 14.45 27.5 7.2 15.2 14.8 
50-54  4.2 21.0 8.0 7.65 13.2 2.9 16.4 9.6 
55-59  12.7 7.4 3.7 2.1 0.0 4.9 11.3 5.0 
60-64  1.5 4.8 2.1 1.85 1.8 2.9 10.5 3.0 
65 and ↑  20.6 4.8 3.8 1.25 51.7 0.2 11.7 4.3 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 
N 7,360 29,013 59,079 8,373 760 22,211 2,672 152,805 
Source: Public housing in Singapore: Residents’ profile & physical aspects HDB sample household survey 
2003; table 7.6  
 
 
                                                
12 Census of population 2000; household and housing p82 table 31 
13 Public housing in Singapore: Residents’ profile & physical aspects HDB sample household survey 2003; 
table 7.6 Preferred housing & flat type to move by age group of residents HD7371.12 Pub 2005 
14 Census of Population 2000: Household and Housing p82 Table 31 
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TABLE 3.10: PROPERTY TAX APPORTIONING RATIOS 
Age of 
Resident 
1 & 2 
Rooms 
3 Rooms 4 Rooms 5 Rooms 
& Exec 




25-29 0.0018 0.0156 0.03498 0.01944 0.00714 0.00282 0.08178  
30-34 0.0045 0.02626 0.0594 0.0558 0.01512 0.00174 0.16282 
35-39 0.00185 0.03432 0.08118 0.05928 0.01494 0.01074 0.20231 
40-44 0.0034 0.04004 0.05346 0.03996 0.01194 0.00564 0.15444 
45-49 0.01895 0.04498 0.0429 0.03468 0.00432 0.00912 0.15495 
50-54 0.0021 0.0546 0.0264 0.01836 0.00174 0.00984 0.11304 
55-59 0.00635 0.01924 0.01221 0.00504 0.00294 0.00678 0.05256 
60-64 0.00075 0.01248 0.00693 0.00444 0.00174 0.0063 0.03264 
65-69 0.0103 0.01248 0.01254 0.003 0.00012 0.00702 0.04546 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Goods & service tax (GST) 
As part of tax reform and global tax competition, a global shift from reliance on 
direct tax (e.g. income tax) towards relying on indirect tax (such as our GST) was 
observed over time.  In Singapore, a similar trend also occurred.  This is seen through a 
steady reduction of income tax rates (refer to Tables 3.4 and 3.5) and an increment of 
GST from 3% to 5% in 1 January 2004 and 5% to 7% in 1 July 2007.  As such, receipt 
from GST is steadily increasing while that of income tax suggested a reverse picture.  
(Refer to Figure 3.11) 


































































Source: IRAS Annual Report 2004, Appendix 1, p38 (income tax) & 84 (GST) 
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GST is a tax on consumption.  Therefore, we relied on theories of consumption 
behavior to apportion GST.  Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) suggested by Milton 
Friedman provided an anchor for this thought process.  PIH says that consumption is only 
affected by permanent component of income (Yp) and not actual income (Y).  (Refer to 
Figure 3.12)  Therefore, consumers with rational expectation will engage in a 
consumption smoothing behavior to even out the path of consumption over their lifetime.  
However, further research revealed that consumption because of liquidity constraint 
actually exhibit “excess sensitivity” to actual income such that consumption tend to track 
actual income closely over time; whether or not these income changes are anticipated.  
Thus although GST is non-age specific, it follows a lifetime consumption pattern.  
Consequently, using this theoretical underpinning, we use average monthly income 
(actual income: Y) by age group as proxy for consumption pattern.15  Therefore, age 
assumption is identical to that of income tax.   
  
GST is then apportioned using total (not average) monthly income by age group 
with the same reason that employment rate by age group should be accounted for.  Then 
proportions are calculated by answering the question: with S$1 received by the 






                                                





Taxes under this subtitle are all non-age specific.  Receipts from motor vehicles 
are apportioned evenly over the legal driving age: from ages 18 to 62.  Betting and 
customs & excise tax receipts are averaged evenly starting from 18 (legal age for betting, 
buying cigarettes and liquor) to 80.  (This is more or less arbitrary: assuming that the 
extent they can consume these “bads” is until 80).  Stamp duty is divided evenly across 




From Table 3.13 and Figure 4.14, we notice that indirect benefits like social 
goods and services and defense constitute the greatest spending component. Direct 
benefits however are considerably smaller. Within direct benefits, education is the single 
largest component (which stays at about 25% of total benefits) and health expenditure is 
observed to be on the rise.  
FIGURE 3.12: PERMANENT INCOME HYPOTHESIS 
 
C = ҝ Yp       ------------(1) 
Yp = Y-Yt    ------------(2) 
 
where,  
 ҝ is the factor of proportionality (scaling factor) 
 Yp is permanent income: expected average long-term income from both ‘human 
and non-human wealth’ 
 Yt  is transitory income that is by nature short-termed e.g. lottery winning 
 Y is actual income: Y = Yp + Yt    from equation (2) 
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TABLE 3.13: BREAKDOWN OF BENEFITS IN PERCENTAGE 
 Social g/s Defense Baby bonus Health Education WIS 
2004 30.26 36.29 0.05 7.23 26.16 0.00 
2005 28.16 38.84 0.05 7.41 25.54 0.00 
2006 25.61 38.61 0.05 7.43 26.77 1.54 
2007 26.18 38.84 0.04 8.37 25.83 0.73 
Source: Author’s computation; raw figures from Budget Highlights FY2007 
Note: WIS starts in 2006 
 
 




The benefits residents receive are determined by the level of government 
expenditure.  The expenditure pattern has been mainly focused on maintenance (mostly 
operating costs) and development (mostly building of new infrastructures such as 
libraries, roads, schools and so on).  Generally, operating costs of government depends on 
the daily activities of the government.  It is the development component that government 
uses as a countercyclical fiscal instrument to boost the economy (aggregate demand) in 
times of recession.  This economic rational comes directly from Keynesian demand side 
management of the economy.  In times of recession, Keynesian economists see this as a 
phenomenon of ailing demand for goods and services by the household.  Consequently, a 
simple solution proposed is for the government to spend.  Through a multiplier effect, 
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every dollar the government spends will generate an income of more than a dollar as it 
moves through the economic system.  The government’s use of fiscal policy to stabilize 
the economy is fairly evident from history.  Take for example, in the aftermath of 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis and 2001 Burst of the Dotcom bubble, Singapore government 
started a long series of building projects such as the Northeast MRT line, rebuilding 
government schools and universities and upgrading HDB flats.16  Although these 
spending components tend to varied according to economic condition, government’s 
commitment to education and defense never wavered.  This is evident from Figures 3.15 
and 3.16, there exist no dips in these periods of 1997 and 2001 when Singapore 
experienced economic recession. In addition, with increasing pressure from aging 
population, we have observed a significant increment in health care expenditure (refer to 
Figure 3.17); especially in operating costs after financial year 2000.   
 
































Source: The budget for the financial years 1990/91 to 2004/05 from Accountant General’s office 
 
                                                
16 Fiscal leakage in Singapore is large because of the openness of the economy.  Dynamic multiplier for 
government consumption is 0.05 (short run) and 0.79 (long run) p129. Dynamic multiplier for government 
investment is 0.44 (short run) and 0.70 (long run) p131 (Abeysinghe and Choy, 2007) 
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Source: The budget for the financial years 1990/91 to 2004/05 from Accountant General’s office 
 































Source: The budget for the financial years 1990/91 to 2004/05 from Accountant General’s office 
 
 
In our exercise, we identified six main benefiting areas for residents.  Age 
targeted expenditures are baby bonus, education, health care and Workfare Income 




3.3.2.1 Baby Bonus 
Baby bonus introduced in 2001 demonstrated government’s effort to encourage 
more child births through monetary rewards.  Under this scheme, 2nd and 3rd ordered 
children will receive a one time grant of S$500 and S$1000 respectively.  In addition, a 
second part of Baby bonus scheme comes in the form of Children’s Development 
Account (CDA).  This is a co-saving plan in which the government matches each dollar 
the parents put aside for their 2nd and 3rd child every year for the next 5 years after birth.  
This co-saving plan will cap at S$3000 and S$6000 for the 2nd and 3rd ordered child 
respectively.   
 
In this exercise, the CDA component is ignored because it depended on parents’ 
saving for their children of which there exists no data.  The average benefit each child 
receives annually for ages 1 to 6 is tabulated by multiplying the percentage of 2nd order 
child (36%) with S$500 and that of 3rd ordered child (14%) multiplied by S$1000.    
 
3.3.2.2 Education 
Government expenditure on education comes through either as subsidies for 
normal curriculum activities, sponsorships for enrichment programs, upgrading of school 
facilities or scholarships and bursaries for students; where tuition subsidy is the greatest 
component.  Levels of education taken are primary, secondary, junior college (JC) & 
centralized institutes, institute of technical education (ITE), polytechnic and university.   
Therefore we are looking at ages 7 to 24.  In this exercise, we only take note of 
mainstream education.    
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MOE’ provides data for spending per person for each of the level of education17 
(refer to Table 3.20).  Then using enrolment18 for each level of education (refer to Table 
3.19), we calculate the total education benefit for each age group.  Subsequently, these 
figures will be transformed into average figures by dividing across the number of people 
in each age group. 
 
As an illustration, for example, for age 19, there are 1,736 students in centralized 
institutes year three; 18,234 students in Polytechnic year two; 10,566 students in ITE year 
two and 6,222 female students in University year one.  (19 year old male citizens having 
graduated from JC in 2003 are serving National Service.)  Correspondingly, government 
spends S$11,600 on one student from centralized institute, S$16,500 per student for 
polytechnic, S$13,900 per student for ITE and S$26,800 per student for university.  Thus 
S$13,790.00 per student for aged 19 is obtained by taking total expenditure for age 19 
divided by the number of people aged 19.   
 
TABLE 3.18: EDUCATION BENEFIT FOR AGE 19 
 Enrolment Benefit per student (S$) Total  
Centralized 1,736 11,600 11600*1736 Sum ÷ 
Polytechnic 18,234 16,500 16500*18324 46,020** 
ITE 10,566 13,900 13900*10566 = S$ 13,790 
University (Female) 6,222 26,800 26800*6222 Per student 
University (Male) 0 (NS) 26,800 0 Aged 19 
** Note: not divided by 36,758 – total enrolment age 19 but by 46,020 – total residents age 19. 








                                                
17 Education Statistics Digest 2004 (www.moe.edu.sg ) Page xi 
18 Ibid Pages 9, 11, 21, 39 
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TABLE 3.19: AGE SPECIFIC ENROLMENT 
Age Primary Sec JC Centralized Poly ITE Uni_F Uni_M Total 
7 46367 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,367 
8 48327 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48,327 
9 48494 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48,494 
10 49574 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49,574 
11 49983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49,983 
12 49585 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49,585 
13 0 47178 0 0 0 0 0 0 47,178 
14 0 50327 0 0 0 0 0 0 50,327 
15 0 47683 0 0 0 0 0 0 47,683 
16 0 52907 0 0 0 0 0 0 52,907 
17 0 12376 11764 19147 0 0 0 43,287 
18 0 0 10635 17994 11650 0 0 40,279 








ends 5779 NS 5,779 
21 0 0 0 0 NS NS 5726 5972 11,698 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 5854 5640 11,494 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5311 5,311 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5290 5,290 
Note: Uni_F and Uni_M are for female and male university students respectively 
Source: Education Statistics Digest 2004 pages 11, 21 and 9 
 
 
TABLE 3.20: AGE SPECIFIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
 
Age Primary Sec JC Centralized Poly ITE Uni_F Uni_M Total 
7 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
8 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
9 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
10 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
11 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
12 4100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,100 
13 0 6500 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,500 
14 0 6500 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,500 
15 0 6500 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,500 
16 0 6500 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,500 
17 0 6500 11600 16500 0 0 0 11,581.31 
18 0 0 11600 16500 13900 0 0 12,633.39 








ends 26800 NS 3,529.56 
21 0 0 0 0 NS NS 26800 26800 7,144.63 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 26800 26800 7,020.04 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26800 3,243.73 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26800 3,230.90 
Note: Uni_F and Uni_M are age specific university enrollment for female and male students respectively 
Source: Author’s own computation 
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3.3.2.3 Healthcare 
In the face of aging population, government expenditure on health care registered 
a persistent increase and is projected to continue this trend in the future.  (See Table 3.17)   
Although governmental subsidies on healthcare come in many forms, the most 
considerable portion of that comes from hospitalization.  In this exercise, we selected 
several major conditions for hospitalization for the age groups 0-9, 10-54 and 55 & above 
based on the most common ailments.  For 0-9 years old, asthma without complication, 
Gastroenteritis and ear infection (category <10 years old) are selected (refer to Table 
3.21).  For 10 to 54 years old, head injuries and diabetes are selected (refer to Table 
3.22).  Lastly for ages 55 and above, heart surgery, stroke with complications, lung 
cancer and cataract surgery are picked (refer to Table 3.23).  Average hospital bill is 
tabulated from these representative conditions for these 3 age groups (For tabulation, 
refer to Tables 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23).   
 
In addition, age-specific hospitalization rates should also be taken into account.  
This is because the average medical bills for representative conditions of old people are 
unquestionably high because these are usually the more serious conditions and are 
frequently accompanied by complications.  However, the older residents also have higher 
probability of hospitalization given their deteriorating health conditions.  Therefore the 
second concern will further accentuate the proportion of health spending for older 
persons.  Taking these two factors into consideration, health care spending is apportioned 
by the proportion of total (not average) hospitalization bill pertaining to each age group.  
(Refer to Table 3.24) 
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TABLE 3.21: HOSPITAL BILL FOR AGE 0-919 
 Volume* S$ Weighted Average (S$) S$ 
Asthma  
KKH 226 974 266*974 Sum ÷ (226+38)  
NUH 38 862 38*826 = 952.69  
Gastroenteritis  
KKH 322 1047 322*1047 Sum ÷ (322+35) Sum ÷ 3 
NUH 35 836 35*836 = 1017.18 = 943.50 
Ear infection (middle ear age <10)   
KKH 257 894 257*894 Sum ÷ (257+31)  
NUH 31 584 31*584 = 860.63  
*Volume is the number of cases from 1 April 05 to 1 March 06; over one year.  2004 figures could not be found.  Thus 
we assume there are little change between 2004 and 2005 figures. 





TABLE 3.22: HOSPITAL BILL FOR AGE 10-54 
 Volume S$ Weighted Average (S$) S$ 
Diabetes (age < 60; without complication) 
AH 30 534 30*534   
CGH 63 573 63*573 Sum ÷   
NUH 82 714 82*714 (30+63+82+112+105)  
SGH 112 590 112*590 =  642.54 Sum ÷ 2 
TTSH 105 716 105*716  = 558.01 
Injury (head) 
KKH 100 371 100*371 Sum ÷ (48+100)  
TTSH 48 687 48*687 = 473.49  
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Short Forms Full Name 
AH Alexandra Hospital 
CGH Changi general Hospital 
ESH East Shore Hospital  
GH Gleneagles Hospital 
MAH Mount Alvernia Hospital 
MEH Mount Elizabeth Hospital 
NHC National Heart Centre 
NUH National University Hospital 
SNEC Singapore National Eye Centre 
TTSH Tan Tock Seng Hospital 
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TABLE 3.23: HOSPITAL BILL FOR AGE 55 AND ABOVE 
 Volume S$ Weighted Average (S$) S$ 
Heart Surgery 
NHC 31 16452 16452 16452  
Stroke with complications 
CGH 34 4396 34*4396 Sum ÷   
SGH 61 5144 61*5144 (34+61+57)  
TTSH 57 3828 57*3828 =  4483.184  
Cataract Surgery 
AH 168 1988 168*1988   
CGH 72 2894 72*2894   
ESH 231 3410 231*3410 Sum ÷ Sum ÷ 4 
GH 1120 3754 1120*3754 (168+72+231+1120 = 6164.18 
MAH 472 3263 472*3263 +472+618+391  
MEH 618 3660 618*3660 +3036+1369)  
NUH 391 3110 391*3110 = 3105.93  
SNEC 3036 2900 3036*2900   
TTSH 1369 2824 1369*2824   
Lung Cancer  
SGH 61 619 61*619 Sum ÷ (61+44)  
TTSH 44 611 44*611 = 615.61  









total cost proportion age specific  
(for entire age group) 
per person 
0-4 943.50 46453.44 43828938 0.049716 98427005.15 494.11 
5-9 ״ 6960.96 6567683.3 0.00745 14749100.3 61.02 
10-14 558.01 5955.36 3323178.9 0.00377 7462890.166 28.57 
15-19 ״ 8881.86 4956209.2 0.005622 11130199.63 48.37 
20-24 ״ 13054.3 7284492.4 0.008263 16358844.32 74.56 
25-29 ״ 15365.07 8573936.3 0.009726 19254558.89 76.32 
30-34 ״ 19060.92 10636275 0.012065 23885970.36 79.70 
35-59 ״ 16937.5 9451375.4 0.010721 21225031.26 67.92 
40-44 ״ 18029.12 10060516 0.011412 22592982.18 68.55 
45-49 ״ 20229 11288081 0.012804 25349736.23 82.71 
50-54 ״ 20749.68 11578628 0.013134 26002220.32 103.76 
55-69 6164.18 19020.42 117245290 0.132993 263298707.5 1470.12 
60-64 ״ 17958.26 110697944 0.125566 248595280.6 1969.85 
65-69 ״ 19542.52 120463608 0.136643 270526111.3 2729.83 
≥ 70 ״ 27773.12 171198507 0.194192 384461888.8 5072.06 
Note: Computation based on raw data from http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/publications/statistics 






Defense is a public good which can be provided at zero marginal cost to an 
additional person.  The cost of providing this public good is taken to be the expenditure 
of the Ministry of Defence for Financial Year 2004/05.  This benefit is taken to be flat 
across total residents of Singapore.   
 
3.3.2.5 Social goods and Services 
Social goods and services includes infrastructures like roads, airports, police & 
civil defense, public libraries, sports facilities and sewage system.  We take the costs for 
these services from the expenditures of Ministry of community Development & Sports, 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Information 
Communication & Arts, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of National Development.   
This is also apportioned uniformly across all age groups.     
 
3.3.2.6 Workfare Bonus/ Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) 
Social welfare programs have traditionally been the mechanism through which 
developed economies address the problems of the lower income and income inequality.   
However, these schemes have increasingly less preferred due to its high fiscal cost and 
erosion effects on work ethic.  One of the newer and more efficient concept developed is 
wage supplement i.e. government provide financial support based on monthly wage.   
Wage supplement is a new concept in Singapore.  The workfare bonus is introduced as 
part of the Progress Package last year to test out this concept with Singaporeans.  In the 
coming January 2008, Workfare Income Supplement (previously known as Workfare 
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Bonus) will extend to a bigger pool of workers: for those 35 years old with monthly wage 
of S$1500 (as compared to previously 45 years old with monthly wage of S$1000).  This 
is to encourage more low wage workers to save for their longer-term needs.  We include 
WIS as ‘we are now ready to take a step further by making workfare income supplements 
a long-term feature of our social security’ (Mr Tharman, 2007 Budget Highlights).   
 
Since the new group of workers (aged 35 to 44) will only get three-quarters of the 
sum paid to those 45 and above, we first divide the eligible workers into two groups i.e. 
those between 35 to 44 and those 45 and above.  By dividing WIS grant into seven parts 
and apportion to the two groups such that those aged 35 to 44 only gets ¾ of those paid 
out to the aged 45 and above.  So that now we have two groups to apportion between 
them separately.  Subsequently, WIS is allocated to each person by multiplying with the 
proportion of people in each age group above 35 years old with income less than or 














3.4 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 































Source: Author’s own computation 
 
3.4.1 Age Specific Tax 2004 
From Figure 3.25, the most interesting components are income tax, property tax 
and GST.  As observed, personal income tax contribution had a bell shaped 
representation though it is a little skewed to the right.  We see minimum contribution 
from ages 15 to 24 years old.  Actually from our age specific matrix (for tax), we 
observed that the annual wages earned by age groups 15 to 19 do not even exceed first 
S$20,000 to be taxed.  Subsequently, their contribution stands at S$0.  From 20 to 24 
years old, annual income is equally low therefore a typical person in these age groups are 
only taxed at a mere S$85.11. (Refer to Table 3.26)  From Figure 3.25 we can easily 
observe that the incidence of income tax fall to the age groups 30 to 39; with its peak at 
30 to 34 years old.      
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Property tax contribution is highlighted with purple on Figure 3.25 to make it 
visible.  This is mainly because residential properties are taxed at 10%.  However, 
housing properties that are resided by their owners are taxed at a mere rate of 4%.  Most 
residential properties owned fall into this lot, consequently explained the minimum 
contribution.  This is not unexpected as property tax is not used to finance local public 
goods (such as schools and parks) as typically used in many developed countries.    
 
GST is apportioned by purchasing power of residents across age groups.   
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the path of consumption mirrored that of income 
tax.  Notwithstanding, the same bell shaped with a slight skewness to the right figure is 
observed.  One interesting concession we observed from Table 3.26 is that although we 
discussed above that age groups 20 to 24 only pay a minimal income tax contribution of 
S$84.81, they pay a much higher GST of S$727.78 in 2004.  This is consistent with 
theory that for low wage earning groups, their propensity to consume is high; as such, 
they spend a bigger proportion of their income than higher wage earning groups.  
Another reason is because of income allowance deduction for the low-wage workers. 
TABLE 3.26: AGE SPECIFIC INCOME TAX AND GST CONTRIBUTION 
Age Income Tax (S$) GST (S$) 
15-19 0 92.90 
20-24 84.81 727.78 
25-29 1,251.90 1,404.56 
30-34 2,318.38 1,687.23 
35-39 2,287.50 1,606.04 
40-44 2,004.45 1,441.84 
45-49 1,516.49 1,341.50 
50-54 960.02 1,050.93 
55-59 263.59 595.52 
60-64 0 201.67 
65-69 0 55.18 
70-74 0 7.75 
≥ 75 0 0 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Source: Author’s own computation 
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3.4.2 Age specific benefits 2004 
Figure 3.27a shows an interesting pattern.  We clearly see that two groups of 
people benefited enormously from government expenditure.  They are the young and the 
old. In specific areas like education and health care; with education more for the young 
and health care more for the old.  Singapore over time has experienced rapid changes in 
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her demographic landscape. Post World War II period saw a period of baby boom.  
However, with the success of Government’s family planning policy of “two is enough”, 
Singapore has experienced a period of persistent declining fertility rate since 1970s. 
(Refer to Figure 3.30)  As a result of over success with “two is enough” policy, we are 
currently facing the problem of aging population.  
 
For education, we observed from Table 3.20 that expenditure steadily increases 
with its peak at 18 years old of S$14,454.  This is rather surprising because university 
education is the most costly and highly subsidized.  However by peaking at 18 years old, 
this is the age even before students entering university at 19 years old.  This could be 
explained by the simple recollection that male students enter National Service at 19.   
Therefore, about 5000 of the 19 year olds are actually “away”.  In addition, university 
entry rate is but a mere 23.3%. (Refer to Table 3.28)  Therefore, when divided across 
number of residents in these age groups, university education does not ‘stand out’ 
contrary to our normal expectation.  This is also because government spends more on 
primary education and secondary education, which is targeted at the general population. 
TABLE 3.28: PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%) 
Primary 97 95 96 95 94 
Secondary 99 100 98 99 98 
Post-secondary (including both JC & Centralized 
institutes and ITE) 
48 48 49 50 49 
Net entry Rates (%) 
Tertiary (Type B: Polytechnic) 37.7 40.0 41.3 39.9 42.3 
Tertiary (Type A: University) 21.9 22.3 22.5 22.4 23.3 
Source: Education Statistics Digest 2004 (www.moe.edu.sg ) Page X, Table: Participation in Education 
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Another benefit restricted to the young is baby bonus.  Again, this portion had to 
be highlighted bright yellow to make it more apparent.  Such a small proportion actually 
echoed the fact baby bonus scheme has rather limited success.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.27a, older people benefited most from health care 
expenditure.  It rises steadily from 55 years old onwards with the most significant jump at 
the age of 70.  There are also health benefits for the age groups 10 to 54; though from 
Figure 3.27a, it is barely visible. (Figure 3.27b re-plots a zoomed-in version)  This is 
because primary care20 is mainly paid by private individuals or through high co-payment 
scheme. (Refer to Table 3.29)   
 
Global phenomenon of aging population is increasingly evident in Singapore 
(Refer to Figure 3.30).  Singapore’s aging population is characterized by aging “from the 
bottom.”21  This means that as today’s young people move into their working years, they 
are being replaced by a much smaller cohort of children due to rapid fertility decline.  We 
know that population growth and population aging are the two main drivers of healthcare 
expenditure.  As population in Singapore levels out, aging is replacing population growth 
as the more important of the two.  Consequently, confronted with an increasing 
                                                
20 Definition: Socially appropriate, universally accessible, scientifically sound first level care provided by 
a suitably trained workforce supported by integrated referral systems and in a way that gives priority to 
those most need, maximises community and individual self-reliance and participation and involves 
collaboration with other sectors. It includes the following: 
• health promotion 
• illness prevention 
• care of the sick 
• advocacy 
• community development. 
21 Mackellar, Landis; Ermolieva, Tatiana; Horlacher, David; Mayhew, Leslie (2004) The economic Impacts 
of Population Ageing in Japan (Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, USA) p2 
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dependence ratio in Singapore, we know that high and increasing health care burden is 
here to stay.  This is also evident from the increasing trend of health expenditure in Table 
3.17.  Notwithstanding, healthcare cost containment has become a progressively 
prominent issue.   
 
TABLE 3.29: COMPARISON BETWEEN PRIVATE OUT-OF-POCKET-
EXPENDITURE & GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
Total health expenditure as % of 
GDP 
 3.1 
Public expenditure as % of total 35.8 
Private expenditure as % of total 64.2 
Health expenditure 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a % 
of total 
64.2 
Public health as a % of total 
public expenditure 
Public health expenditure as % of 
total public health expenditure 
5.5 
Public expenditure 411 Per capita health expenditure in 
S$ Out-of pocket expenditure 737 
Source: (Chia, 2002) Health for all: Financing and Delivery Issues, p167 
 





















Source: Yearbook of Statistics 2005 p23 
 
Putting both Figures 3.27 and 3.25 together, we observe that tax collection 
primarily fall on our labor force.  However, benefits are largely falling onto the young 
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and old.  For one, this represents government’s redistribution role.  For another, this is a 
worrying sign given that present fertility rate is 1.24 which is below the replacement rate 
of 2.1.    
 
3.5 ANTICIPATING NEXT CHAPTER 
We have finished discussing relative profiles in chapter three.  The next set of 
matrices constructed is the population matrices.  In chapter four, we will first introduce 
the life-table, which will prepare for the Leslie method of population projection in 
chapter five.        
 
      
 




Although the Department of Statistics, Singapore already has a life table, its 
complete form is not available for public use.  Consequently, this chapter constructs the 
abridged life table based on the population of Singapore in 2004. Life table gives a 
useful summary of the mortality experience as the population goes through their lives.  
The original concept of a life table (known as the cohort life table) is conceived from the 
idea of following a generation or cohort born in certain year, e.g. in 2004 until the last of 
that birth cohort dies.  Then the mortality experience of this 2004 birth cohort is 
constructed.  This kind of longitudinal life table, based on a real mortality experience, is 
however expensive and time consuming.     
 
In practice, a life table (also know as the current life table) is usually based on a 
hypothetical generation whose mortality experience is based on the age specific 
mortality schedule of its population in a given year (e.g. 2004).  This means that as the 
hypothetical generation passes through the first five years if its life, it will follow the 
mortality experience of the 0-4 years old of the population in 2004.  Similarly, as it 
matures, its mortality experience will be the age specific mortality rate of the population 
in 2004.  It is assumed that the birth cohort is closed to immigration so there will be no 
additions to the cohort as a result of immigration.   
 
Data comes mainly from two sources.  Firstly, Population Trend 2006 can be 
downloaded from the Department of Statistics website.1  Secondly, we will also need the 
Yearbook of Statistics 2005.    
                                                
1 Department of Statistics website: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/people.html#demo 
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4.2 LIFE TABLE FUNCTIONS  
This section introduces the basic functions of a life table.  Our presentation of the 
construction process will also adhere to the following order.   
 
 
4.3 CONSTRUCTING THE LIFE TABLE 
A life table can be classified according to the length of age interval.  A complete 
life table contains data for every single year of age with an open-ended interval at 100 
years old.  An abridged life table on the other hand tends to have either quinquennial or 
decennial age intervals.  The abridged life table will be elaborated further later.  Life 
tables are also necessarily gender specific as males and females have different mortality 
experiences.  However the method of construction is the same.  Therefore in the 
following presentation, there will not be any attempts to distinguish between both 
genders.   
 
There exist various methods of constructing the life table.  These methods 
generally differ with regards to the method of deriving nqx: the probability of death from 
x Age at the beginning of the interval 
n Length of the interval (in our case is a 5 year interval, n = 5) 
nmx Age specific death rate (ASDR) from x to x+n 
nqx Probability of death from x to x+n [So npx (= 1 – nqx ) is the probability of 
survival] 
lx Number surviving at age x from the original birth cohort 
ndx Number of deaths from x to x+n 
nLx The number of life-years lived by lx people who attained age x, over the 
years of age from x to x+n 




0  The complete expectation of life at age x  
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age specific death rate (ASDR) and nLx: the number of life-years lived by lx people who 
attained age x, over the years of age from x to x+n.  The rest of the functions have 
specific relationships and could be derived with relative ease once we have nqx and nLx.   
 
In our life table, we adhere closely to Greville (1943) method of converting nmx to 
nqx.  There are two advantages for using this method.  Firstly, this approach gives 
allowance for non-linearity in the number of people surviving to age x out of lx, the 
initial number of births.  Secondly, with the unique assumption that the age specific 
death rates in the life table population is identical to those observed in actual population, 
it allows nLx to be determined with relative ease.  The main reason however stems from 
the minimum mortality data requirement as there are only limited mortality data that 
Singapore publishes.   
 
4.3.1 Quinquennial Age Intervals (x to x+n): Column 1  
This is the first column of the life table. It is generally in an age interval of 5 
years (n=5) except for two cases.  The first exception is for the last interval 85+, this is 
an open ended interval which includes ages over 85 (inclusive).  The second case arises 
when we separate the usual group 0-4 into age 0 and 1-4.  This distinction is necessary 
because death at young ages tend to be unevenly distributed.  Therefore it does not 
justify pooling age-intervals 0 and 1-4.   
 
Our age intervals are continuous and mutually non-exclusive.  Take for example, 
a person age 4 years and 11 months will fall in the interval 1-4.  However as soon as he 
reaches age 5 exactly, he will be in age-interval 5-9.   
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4.3.2 Age Specific Death Rates (ASDR), nmx: Column 2 













                                                    (4.1)                                      
 
 where  
nDx: the number of deaths between ages x to x+5 in 2004 
nPx: the number of residents between ages x to x+5 in 2004 
 
However, from Yearbook of Statistics, mortality data is especially inadequate.  
Therefore, we directly used the ASDR inputs from Population Trend 2006.  The ASDR 
for age 0 interval, however, warrants special treatment.  For this interval, ASDR is based 
on mid-year population and death figures covering three calendar years.  Consequently, 



















                                            (4.2) 
 
where: 
D03, D04 and D05 are the number of deaths aged 0 in 2003, 2004 and 2005 
P03, P04 and P05 are the number of residents aged 0 in 2003, 2004 and 2005 
 
4.3.3 Probability of Dying, nqx: Column 3 
This function is defined as the probability of dying for a person who is exactly x 
years of age to die before he reaches x+n.  This measure of mortality differs from ASDR 
as it relates the number of deaths for individual entering this age interval [x, x+n] within 
a particular year.  ASDR, on the other hand, relates to the same number of deaths to 
individuals living within the same interval.   
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We use Greville’s formula to compute nqx for all age intervals except for age 
groups 0 and 85+.  Using the Euler-Maclaurin2 (1735) summation formula and extensive 














                                     (4.3) 
 
Based on the assumption that nmx follows Gompertz’s law3, the constant ‘k’ is estimated 














                                   (4.4) 
 
However for extreme old age, 85+, Gompertz’s law (1825) fails to adequately 
describe the age pattern of mortality.  Rather than increase exponentially as the 
Gompertz equation would predict, a deceleration in the rate of increase has been 
observed.  However since nqx for the open-ended interval 85+ is by definition equals to 1, 
because all individuals are expected to die eventually, we will not be concerned with this 
problem.  However, if we are building complete life table, we should correct this 
problem and refrain from use Greville’s formula for ages 85 and above.4    
 
                                                
2 In mathematics, the Euler-Maclaurin formula provides a powerful connection between integrals (see 
calculus) and sums. It can be used to approximate integrals by finite sums, or conversely to evaluate finite 
sums and infinite series using integrals and the machinery of calculus. The formula was discovered 
independently by Leonhard Euler and Colin Maclaurin around 1735. Euler needed it to compute slowly 
converging infinite series while Maclaurin used it to calculate integrals. 
3 Gompertz’s law: observed by Benjamin Gompertz (1825) that between sexual maturity and extremely 
old age mortality progresses geometrically as age increases arithmetically.  
4 One suggestion is to look at Method for Constructing Complete Annual US Life Table p7.  
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For age group 0, we use the conventional approximation for q0: infant mortality 
rate (IMR).   
 
4.3.4 Number of survivals, lx: Column 4 
lx shows the number of individuals who survive (at age x) out of the original 
population.  In our life table, we use a radix of l0 = 100,000.  By definition, lx is a 
decreasing function of nqx.  The following gives the formula: 
 
! 
lx+n = lx (1"n qx ) = lx (n px )                                     (4.5) 
npx is the probability of survival and therefore the complement of nqx; 
[nqx+npx=1].    
 
4.3.5 Number of deaths, ndx: Column 5 
Column 5 represents the number of deaths, from age interval x to x+n, out of the 
original hypothetical birth cohort of 100,000.  It is given by the following relationship: 
  
! 
n dx = lx (n qx )                                                     (4.6) 
 
For the terminal age group, we need everyone from the hypothetical birth cohort to die 







                                                          (4.7) 
 
4.3.6 Number of years lived between years x to x+n,  nLx: Column 6 
This column can be interpreted as the total expected number of life-years lived by 
lx people who attained age x, over the years of age from x to x+n.  This is a measure of 
exposure to the risk of death faced by lx  group over the course of that year.   
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Alternatively, from the demographic theory point of view, we can look at the nLx 
function as a stationary population with a relationship with lx; when lx is assumed to be 
continuous.  Under this perspective, we can also look at the nLx as the number of people 
alive who are aged x last birthday.  (Brown, 1991)  
 
Using Greville’s assumption that that the central age specific death rate is 
equivalent to the observed age specific death rate in the actual population, we can obtain 











                                                       (4.8) 
 
This is done for all age groups except for the younger age groups of age 0, 1-4 
and 5-9 as their distribution of mortality is uneven.  Therefore we have to use Reed-



























                               (4.9) 
 
We can use Reed-Merrell method to complement Greville method because results 
obtained from Greville method have been observed to be similar to that of Reed-Merrell 
                                                
5 Reed-Merrell method (1939) is empirically determined. It shows an empirical relationship between nqx 
and nmx with a constant ‘a’. Following J W Glover’s 1910 series of United States Life Tables, it is found 
that ‘a’ has a value of approximately 0.008.   
! 






 This enables the first generation of life tables to be built by reference to a standard table, which assumes a 
certain relationship among various functions of the life table. The following formulas are suggested to 




































method.  Consequently, Greville method provided the theoretical foundation for Reed-
Merrell method.  (Greville, 1943) 
 
4.3.7 Total numbers of years lived beyond age x, Tx: Column 7 
Tx is defined as the total number of years lived beyond age x by the lx survivals 
who attain age x.  Alternatively, under a stationary population setting, Tx is the number of 
people alive age x and over; where T0 is the total size of the stationary population.  Tx is 
given by the following formula and can be obtained by summing nLx cumulatively.   
! 
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0: Column 8 
This represents the average future life time of those who attained age x.  It is 










                                                   (4.12) 
 




0  the expectation of life at birth.  This is 




4.4 THE LIFE TABLE   
TABLE 4.1: ABRIDGED LIFE TABLE- MALE 2004 
age 





0 0.002466787 0.002200000 100000.00000 220.0000000 99840.72.00 7836734.855 78.36734855 
1 0.000200000 0.000999538 99780.00000 99.73386478 398850.0204 7736894.135 77.53952831 
5 0.000100000 0.000499884 99680.26614 49.82860916 498262.7947 7338044.114 73.61581583 
10 0.000100000 0.000499884 99630.43753 49.80370062 498037.0062 6839781.319 68.65152346 
15 0.000300000 0.001498960 99580.63383 149.2673685 497557.8950 6341744.313 63.68451444 
20 0.000700000 0.003494340 99431.36646 347.4469981 496352.8544 5844186.418 58.77608472 
25 0.000400000 0.001998151 99083.91946 197.9846371 494961.5928 5347833.564 53.97276968 
30 0.000700000 0.003494340 98885.93482 345.5410745 493630.1065 4852871.971 49.07545223 
35 0.000900000 0.004490646 98540.39375 442.5100511 491677.8345 4359241.865 44.23812103 
40 0.001600000 0.007970467 98097.88370 781.8859216 488678.7010 3867564.030 39.42556031 
45 0.002300000 0.011439033 97315.99777 1113.200869 484000.3778 3378885.329 34.72075924 
50 0.004100000 0.020306755 96202.79691 1953.566667 476479.6749 2894884.951 30.09148428 
55 0.007100000 0.034922941 94249.23024 3291.460337 463585.9630 2418405.276 25.65968200 
60 0.012000000 0.058362920 90957.76990 5308.561056 442380.0880 1954819.313 21.49150441 
65 0.020600000 0.098233552 85649.20884 8413.626053 408428.4492 1512439.225 17.65853118 
70 0.033300000 0.154264305 77235.58279 11914.69349 357798.6034 1104010.776 14.29406934 
75 0.050200000 0.223839817 65320.88930 14621.41594 291263.2657 746212.1727 11.42379078 
80 0.081500000 0.338931802 50699.47336 17183.66385 210842.5012 454948.9070 8.973444433 
85^ 0.137300000 1.000000000 33515.80951 33515.80951 244106.4058 244106.4058 7.283321194 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
TABLE 4.2: ABRIDGED LIFE TABLE- FEMALE 2004 
age  





0 0.00190077 0.002200000 100000.0000 220.0000000 99840.72000 8327415.341 83.27415341 
1 0.00020000 0.000999538 99780.00000 99.73386478 398850.0204 8227574.621 82.45715195 
5 0.00010000 0.000499884 99680.26614 49.82860916 498262.7947 7828724.601 78.53835974 
10 0.00010000 0.000499884 99630.43753 49.80370062 498037.0062 7330461.806 73.57652931 
15 0.00030000 0.001498960 99580.63383 149.2673685 497557.8950 6832424.800 68.61198345 
20 0.00070000 0.003494340 99431.36646 347.4469981 496352.8544 6334866.905 63.71095089 
25 0.00020000 0.000999538 99083.91946 99.03810608 495190.5304 5838514.051 58.92494042 
30 0.00030000 0.001498960 98984.88135 148.3743595 494581.1983 5343323.520 53.98120852 
35 0.00050000 0.002497111 98836.50699 246.8057698 493611.5395 4848742.322 49.05821209 
40 0.00100000 0.004988454 98589.70122 491.8101705 491810.1705 4355130.782 44.17429740 
45 0.00150000 0.007474039 98097.89105 733.1875019 488791.6680 3863320.612 39.38230038 
50 0.00250000 0.012427989 97364.70355 1210.047452 484018.9807 3374528.944 34.65864755 
55 0.00440000 0.021777535 96154.65610 2094.011410 475911.6840 2890509.963 30.06105040 
60 0.00660000 0.032501004 94060.64469 3057.065386 463191.7251 2414598.279 25.67065415 
65 0.01170000 0.056943094 91003.57930 5182.025367 442908.1510 1951406.554 21.44318464 
70 0.01870000 0.089561766 85821.55394 7686.329913 411033.6852 1508498.403 17.57715089 
75 0.03120000 0.145227327 78135.22402 11347.36975 363697.7485 1097464.718 14.04571026 
80 0.06020000 0.262478044 66787.85427 17530.34536 291201.7502 733766.9695 10.98653307 
85^ 0.11130000 1.000000000 49257.50891 49257.50891 442565.2193 442565.2193 8.984725966 





Figures 4.3 to 4.6 graph the mortality experience of a typical Singaporean 
differentiated by gender.  Figures 4.3a and 4.3b gives a closed up view of the probability 
of death.  From Figure 4.3 we observe that mortality is generally higher (especially in 
old age) for males than their female counterparts.  Mortality for young ages (as depicted 
in Figure 4.3b) started from a relative high point at age 0.  Subsequently, it showed a 
decreasing trend until the lowest point at about age 10; after which there is a steady 
incrementing trend.  From age 10 to 50, male mortality probability remained slightly 
higher than his female counterpart.   At age 50, the divergent between male and female 
became increasingly accentuated with male mortality probability increasing more 
sharply than female probability.  Figure 4.4: the age specific number of survivals by 
gender mirrors the same trend.   
 
Figure 4.5 shows the number of death (ndx) by gender.  The number of male 
deaths is higher between ages 50 to 75.  However, the number of female deaths is 
concentrated after 80 years old.  This reflects the common knowledge that female 
residents then to live longer and thus the need to tailor long-term care services to them.   
Male residents, though incurring higher medical expenses than female residents during 
old age, tend to require more acute medical care than that of long term health care.   
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Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3a: A CLOSED UP VIEW 
 
Source: Ibid 







































Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
































Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 


































Source: Author’s own calculation 
CHAPTER 5: POPULATION PROJECTION & THE LESLIE 
MATRIX 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO LESLIE MATRIX 
The Leslie matrix is commonly used by demographers to project population.  
Section 5.2 explains the methodology of Leslie matrix and section 5.3 constructs 
Leslie matrix for Singapore based on the population characteristics of our base year: 
2004.  Once the Leslie matrices are presented, we will proceed to population 
projection beginning from section 5.4.   
 
5.2 METHODOLOGY OF LESLIE MATRIX 
The Leslie matrix comes from a simple formula: P(t)=P(0)+B-D+I-E, where 
P(0) is the base year from which population is projected, B is the number of birth, D 
is the number of death, I is immigration and E is emigration.  Therefore population 
projection takes into consideration mortality, fertility and net migration.  Generally, 
Leslie matrix is built closed to future migration.  Adjustments can be done to the 
population projections with the accuracy deemed appropriate.  In addition, Leslie 
matrix is gender specific.  However, since the methodology is identical for both 
genders, in order not to cluster the Equation 5.1, we do not factor in gender 































































  (5.1) 
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The above equation, M, is the Leslie matrix.  This matrix factors in a 
combination of survivorship ratios and fertility with survivorship ratios.  We will first 
discuss the matrix without the first row (with fertility and survivorship ratios) then 
followed by the first row of the matrix separately.   
 
5.2.1 Survivorship Ratios 
Supposing we have a population count at year 2004 and we wish to estimate 
population in 2009, we will first have to separate the population by gender and age; 
with age intervals presented in quinquennial intervals.  So we will have a series of 
data for each gender with five-year age intervals.  For each tjg C  , ‘j’ is the starting age 
of the group, ‘g’ is the age interval and ‘t’ denotes the year of the population count.  
Therefore tjg C  can be explained as the count of population for the group age ‘j’ to 
































2004                     (5.2) 
 
The matrix M, excluding the first row, projects the population for age 5 and 
above.  We know that age group 0-4 will be 5-9 in 5 years time and so on; i.e. 
everyone of age 0-4 age-group (in time ‘t’) will be 5-9 in five years time (t+5) 
subjected to its survival distribution.  We can model survivorship distribution using 
the life table.  As we recall from Chapter Four, 
xn
L  is the number of years lived by 
the lx people (number surviving at age x from the original birth cohort) who attained 





5+  is the survivorship ratio 
for the cohort age ‘x’ over the years of age from x to x+n. Consequently, the 





































                                       (5.3) 
    
5.2.2 Projecting Fertility 





2009.  To 
proceed, we have to estimate all live births and account for their survivorship.  We 
assume the productivity age of females to be 15-44 years old.1  We then use age-
specific fertility rate:2 5f15, 5f20, 5f25,…,5f40 (separately represented for each gender)  to 
model fertility for the next five years.   
 
Notice that for the female group age e.g. 25-29, their contribution to new 























.  This is because 
















fertility for those residents who survive past 30 years old.  Assuming the experience is 
uniformly distributed, we divide the likelihood of having new births between both 
fertility groups equally.  So for a five-year period, the number of births is found by 








, constructed from the life table.  Consequently, the contribution 





t ) is given by: 
                                                
1 Depending on which age interval you start, if the assumed interval is 10-44 years old then the 











 and the formula for row 1 















2 Age-specific fertility rate (for male or for female) is the number of (male or female) babies from age 


















*5 f30)                          (5.4) 
 
There are two special cases in our fertility representation.  As mentioned 
above, we assumed the reproductive age of female residents ranges from 15 to 44; i.e. 
from age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29 to 40-44.  As in earlier analysis, there are birth 
contributions coming from age 10-14 because of the same reasons mentioned above.  





 , some of these female residents who survive past 14 
years old will fall into 15-44 age range and thus contribute to live births.  This gives 
us our first equation below.  Fertility representation from age group 40-44 also has a 





 , for female residents who live 
past 44 years old will not contribute to live birth.  Consequently, we have the 
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5.3  CONSTRUCTING AGE SPECIFIC LESLIE MATRIX 2004 
Leslie matrices are constructed based on equation M shown above in section 
5.2.  Data sources come from the age specific life tables 2004 (Chapter Four, Tables 
4.1 and 4.2) and Yearbook of Statistics 2005.  In Table 5.1, we present the age and 
gender specific fertility rates and survivorship ratios: 
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TABLE 5.1: AGE AND GENDER SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES AND 
SURVIVORSHIP RATIOS 
  Male Female  
age group(x) nfx nLx+5/nLx nfx nLx+5/nLx 
0 0 0.999141862 0 0.999141862 
5 0 0.999546849 0 0.999546849 
10 0 0.999038001 0 0.999038001 
15 0.003412563 0.99757809 0.003187437 0.99757809 
20 0.016597463 0.997197031 0.015502537 0.997658271 
25 0.041571216 0.99730992 0.038828784 0.9987695 
30 0.045862772 0.996045071 0.042837228 0.998039435 
35 0.018096923 0.993900206 0.016903077 0.996350634 
40 0.003205741 0.990426587 0.002994259 0.993862464 
45 0 0.98446137 0 0.990235743 
50 0 0.972939639 0 0.983250044 
55 0 0.954256866 0 0.973272438 
60 0 0.923252335 0 0.956209118 
65 0 0.876037416 0 0.928033689 
70 0 0.814042489 0 0.884836843 
75 0 0.72388978 0 0.800669653 
80 0 0.585803819 0 0.65910994 
85^ 0 nil 0 nil 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
Age specific fertility rate can be obtained from the Yearbook of Statistics 2005.  
However age and gender specific fertility rate, nfx, is not available.  Therefore, we 
obtained this by apportioning each age-specific fertility rate by the actual proportion 
of male and female babies in 2004 (male babies: 19221 & female babies: 17953).  
The rest of the construction follow the methodology mentioned above in Section 5.2. 
 
We present the Leslie Matrices by gender (18 by18 square matrix) in Tables 




TABLE 5.2: LESLIE MATRIX (MALE) 
0 0 0.00850 0.04979 0.14475 0.21770 0.15930 0.05306 0.00799 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.99914 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.99954 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0.99903 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0.99757 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0.99719 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0.99730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99604 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9845 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9729 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9543 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9233 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8760 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8140 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7239 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5858 0 













TABLE 5.3: LESLIE MATRIX (FEMALE) 
0 0 0.00794 0.04651 0.13525 0.20350 0.14888 0.04959 0.00747 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.99914 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.99955 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0.99904 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0.99758 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0.99766 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0.99877 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99635 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99386 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9902 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9833 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9733 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9562 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9280 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8848 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8007 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6591 0 
Source: Author’s own computation
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5.4 POPULATION PROJECTION FOR CLOSED POPULATION 
Based on the Leslie matrix constructed, we will project the population for a 
closed population (without immigration).  Some of the ideas are covered, in part 
above, when we discussed the Leslie matrix in Section 5.2; thus a suitable 
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                (5.6) 
 
From the Equation 5.6, we can see that by allowing for a survivorship of five 










t"1  and so on.  The new 0-4 age-group is however given by a 
























t"1 .  Simply put, a age group 
multiplied by its survivor probability  
 
We can obtain subsequent five-year projections e.g. 2009, 2014, 2019 by 
proceeding with consecutive iterations.  Thus projected population in 2014 (X2014) 
equals to Leslie matrix (L) multiplying with projection population in 2009 (X2009) and 
so on.  Where the consecutive iterations start from X2004: the actual age and gender 
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= L * X
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                     (5.7) 
 
Our output from the Leslie population projection comes in quinquennial 
intervals e.g. 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019,…, etc and for each year, our output is in a five-
year age group distinguished by gender e.g. 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, ….  However, for our 
purpose, we need yearly projections at single age intervals up to age 100  e.g. 0, 1, 
2, …, 100+ (where 100+ is an open interval).  Hence we use spline interpolation to 
interpolate quinquennial intervals into annual population projections.  This 
interpolation procedure generates a smooth interpolated series of figures while 
maintaining original values.  The interpolation of five-year age groups into single-
year age groups is carried out by Beer’s ordinary formula for subdivisions of groups 
into fifths.   
 
5.5 POPULATION PROJECTION WITH IMMIGRATION 
As mentioned above, Leslie projection method only allows for a closed 
population.  However, this will not provide an adequate analysis for Singapore 
because over time, this country has managed to sustain economic growth despite a 
shrinking domestic labor force through liberal immigration policy.  With the sticky 
downward fertility trend, the population target of six million in 2012 can only be 
achieved through further immigration.  We thus employ data from the United Nations: 
World Population Prospects: the 2004 revision database 3  to obtain population 
projection with immigration.   
                                                
3 World population prospects: The 2004 revision Population Data Base; http://esa.un.org/unpp/  
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Data obtained from UN comes in a form similar to that of the Leslie output.  
Therefore, we use the same interpolation methods as described above.  One advantage 
of using the UN data is that it has a high, medium and low fertility variant.   
 
5.6 POPULATION ANALYSIS 
Singapore’s total population4 as at the end of June 2006 was 4,240,300.  There 
were about 3.6 million Singapore residents and 0.88 million non-residents.  Singapore 
residents (Singaporeans and Permanent residents) make up about 80% of total 
population.   
 
5.6.1 Future Population Trend and Age Structure looking at UN projection 
Population growth rate5 had been declining since 1950 and is expected to 
further decline until 2050; end of our projection period.  Though it is fairly evident 
that lower fertility will cause further population growth rate decline as compared to 
higher fertility scenarios.     
FIGURE 5.4: POPULATION GROWTH RATE, SINGAPORE 
 
  Source: UN World Prospects 
                                                
4 De facto population in the country, region or area as at 1 July of that calendar year. 
5 Population growth rate: Average exponential rate of growth of the population over a given period.  It 
is calculated as ln(Pt/P0)/t where t is the length of the period. It is expressed as a percentage. 
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Figure 5.5 shows that Singapore’s population has also grown older over time.  
The median age6 of our population has rose steadily from 20 years old in 1950 to 34.5 
years old in 2000 and expected to grow further to 52.1 years old in 2050 according to 
UN’s projection.  
FIGURE 5.5: MEDIAN AGE OF SINGAPORE 
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
 
Presently, the increase of median age of the population can be explained by 
the fact that the post-war baby boomers, who were aged 5-24 years old in 1970, have 
moved to age group 40-59 in 2004.  Coupled with the fact that fertility has been 
declining, the proportion of children and young adults over the whole population has 
declined.  According to the UN World Prospects projection, this aging population is 
to be a prolonged scenario in Singapore.     
 
                                                
6 Median age: Age that divides the population in two parts of equal size, that is, there are as many 
persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median. 
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Another sign of an aging population is to look at the dependency ratios.7   As 
seen from Figure 5.6, child dependency showed a general decreasing trend from 1950 
onwards.  Although the sharp decline has somewhat abated since 1990s, it is still a 
distinct downward trend.  Old-age dependency, on the other hand, has been increasing 
steadily with a peak in 2035.  Total dependency ratio registered a downward trend 
before 1990 largely due to the decrease in child dependency.  Strong influence from 
the decline in child dependence shadowed the steady increments from old age 
dependency until the 2005-2010 period.  However from 2010 onwards, the stress of 
aging population will set in as the increase in old-age dependency is faster than the 
decline in child dependency.  Needless to say, though a decline in fertility in time t 
can decrease total dependency ratio (through a decline in child dependency), this 
decline in dependency may however be not ‘worthwhile’ in time t+1 as there are 
fewer working adult to support the aged population.       
 
 FIGURE 5.6: DEPENDENCY RATIOS, SINGAPORE  
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
 
                                                
7 Dependency ratios: measures the relative population sizes of residents below 15 and those aged 65 
and above to population in the working ages: 15-64. They reflect the burden on working age population 
in supporting non-working age population.  
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5.6.2 Fertility 
Figure 5.7 shows the crude birth rate8 of Singapore including projections until 
year 2050.  Birth rates registered a general decreasing trend.  From year 2005 
onwards, birth rates are projected according to assumptions.9  However, regardless of 
                                                
8 Crude birth rate: Number of births over a given period divided by the person-years lived by the 
population over that period. It is expressed as number of births per 1,000 population. 
9 Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=4   
Medium-fertility assumptions: 
Total fertility in all countries is assumed to converge eventually toward a level of 1.85 children per 
woman. However, not all countries reach this level during the projection period, that is, by 2050. The 
basic principle of fertility projection is the same for all countries, but projection procedures are slightly 
different depending on whether countries had a total fertility above or below 1.85 children per woman 
in 2000-2005. 
Fertility in high-fertility and medium-fertility countries is assumed to follow a path derived from 
models of fertility decline established by the United Nations Population Division on the basis of the 
past experience of all countries with declining fertility during 1950-2005. The models relate the level 
of total fertility during a period to the average expected decline in total fertility during the next 
period.  If the total fertility projected by a model for a country falls to 1.85 children per woman before 
2050, total fertility is held constant at that level for the remainder of the projection period (that is, until 
2050). That is, 1.85 children per woman represents a floor value below which the total fertility of high 
and medium-fertility countries is not allowed to drop before 2050. However, it is not necessary for all 
countries to reach the floor value by 2050.  If the model of fertility change used produces a total 
fertility above 1.85 children per woman for 2045-2050, that value is used in projecting the 
population.  In all cases, the projected fertility paths yielded by the models are checked against recent 
trends in fertility for each country. When a country’s recent fertility trends deviate considerably from 
those consistent with the models, fertility is projected over an initial period of 5 or 10 years in such a 
way that it follows recent experience. The model projection takes over after that transition period. For 
instance, in countries where fertility has stalled or where there is no evidence of fertility decline, 
fertility is projected to remain constant for several more years before a declining path sets in.   
 
Fertility in low-fertility countries is generally assumed to remain below 2.1 children per woman during 
most of the projection period and reach 1.85 children per woman by 2045-2050. For countries where 
total fertility was below 1.85 children per woman in 2000-2005, it is assumed that over the first 5 or 10 
years of the projection period fertility will follow the recently observed trends in each country. After 
that transition period, fertility is assumed to increase linearly at a rate of 0.07 children per woman per 
quinquennium. Thus, countries whose fertility is currently very low need not reach a level of 1.85 
children per woman by 2050.  
 
High-fertility assumptions: 
Under the high variant, fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children above the fertility in the medium 
variant over most of the projection period. By 2045-2050, fertility in the high variant is therefore half a 
child higher than that of the medium variant. That is, countries reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children 
per woman in the medium variant have a total fertility of 2.35 children per woman in the high variant 
at the end of the projection period. 
 
Low-fertility assumptions: 
Under the low variant, fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children below the fertility in the medium 
 78 
any scenario, we have not observe any distinct increase in birth rates except perhaps 
that of the high fertility rate variant where a slight increase can be seen.   
 
Figure 5.8 shows the decreasing trend in total fertility rate (TRF). 10   
Singapore’s TRF in 2005 has been 1.24 children per female.  It is also evident from 
Figure 5.8 that Singapore’s TRF has been below the replacement rate of 2.1 children 
per woman since 1975.   
 
FIGURE 5.7: CRUDE BIRTH RATE, SINGAPORE 
 






                                                                                                                                      
variant over most of the projection period. By 2045-2050, fertility in the low variant is therefore half a 
child lower than that of the medium variant. That is, countries reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children 
per woman in the medium variant have a total fertility of 1.35 children per woman in the low variant at 
the end of the projection period. 
 
Constant-fertility assumption: 
For each country, fertility remains constant at the level estimated for 2000-2005. 
10 Total fertility rate: The average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at 
the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates of 
a given period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman. 
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FIGURE 5.8: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, SINGAPORE 
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
Age-specific fertility rate11 from Figure 5.9 gives a uniform conclusion that 
there is a tendency to delay childbearing.  While in 1995-2000, fertility peaks at age 
group 25-29 in years 2005-2010, 2015-2020 and 2045-2050, fertility peak later at 
age-group 30-34.  In addition, fertility rate declines in most age groups in 2005-2010 
and 2015-2020 as compared to 1995-2000.  It registers the greatest decline for age 
group 25-29 for both 2005-2010 and 2015-2020.  The fertility rate for years 2045-
2050 is however higher in most age groups as compared to 1995-2000.  The 
observation of delaying childbearing is in fact further accentuated by the fact that 
fertility rate is much higher in age groups 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49 than all 







                                                
11 Age Specific Fertility Rate: Number of births to women in a particular age group, divided by the 
number of women in that age group. The age groups used are: 15-19, 20-24,….,45-49. The data refer to 
five-year periods running from 1 July to 30 June of the initial and final years. 
 80 
FIGURE 5.9: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATE, SINGAPORE 
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
5.6.3 Mortality 
FIGURE 5.10: CRUDE DEATH RATE, SINGAPORE 
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
Over the years, Singapore’s crude mortality rate12 has been decreasing and 
remained at a steady low level.  After the trough of 4.8 in year 1995-2000, mortality 
rate increases and picks up momentum from year 2010 onwards.  Also observing that 
                                                
12 Crude Death Rate: Number of deaths over a given period divided by the person-years lived by the 
population over that period. It is expressed as number of deaths per 1,000 population. 
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the low fertility variant has the highest mortality rate, one plausible interpretation of 
this is that the increase in mortality rate arises mainly through the channel of aging 
population; when the proportion of aged increases, naturally, their mortality 
experience will accentuate.   
 
FIGURE 5.11: INFANT MORTALITY RATE, SINGAPORE 
 
Source: UN World Prospects 
 
Infant mortality13  has been constantly decreasing, though female babies’ 
mortality is lower than that of male babies in the years from 1950 to 2000.  After the 
year 2000, the distinction between female and male cease and it remained at a low 
level of 3 per 100 (female/ male) babies.  
 
5.7 ANTICIPATING NEXT CHAPTER 
We have finished population projection in chapters four and five.  In chapter 
six, we will proceed to project the fiscal budget.  This will be the last set of projection 
needed for GA.   
                                                
13 Infant mortality: Probability of dying between birth and exact age 1. It is expressed as deaths per 
1,000 births. 
CHAPTER 6: FISCAL PROJECTION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the last set of matrices we need for constructing 
generational accounts.  We will project all components of government revenue and 
expenditure.  Fiscal projection is based on assumptions instead of any established 
methodology.  Hence, one of the limitations of GA is its sensitivity to different 
assumptions.  Fiscal projection corresponds to component C (future government 
consumption) from the inter-temporal budget constraint, Equation 2.1.   
 
6.2 DATA SOURCES 
The breakdown of government budget can be obtained from Budget 
Highlights for Financial Year 2007 available from the Ministry of Finance website.1  
The choice of interest rates and growth rates comes from the Yearbook of Statistics 
2006 by the Department of Statistics, Singapore.    
 

















          (2.1) 
 
            A                     +            B                     =            C                +           D 
Present value (PV) of          PV of net tax                PV of all future       government 
remaining net tax        +      payments of          =     government       +     net 




We reproduce Equation 2.1 for easy reference.  Equation 2.1 is the inter-
temporal budget constrain requiring the subsequent government consumptions 
                                                




expressed in present value and government debts to be covered by the net tax 
payments of existing generations and Future generation with values expressed in 
present value.  Equation 2.1 also demonstrates the simultaneity problem: that we 
cannot determine the fiscal burden on the future generation without knowing the 
future path of government consumption and the generational accounts (net tax paid) 
of the current generation.  Thus making it impossible to assess the inter-temporal 
effect of our present fiscal policy without making assumptions on the future paths of 
both government expenditure and taxation. (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1994)    
 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the long term implication of our 
present fiscal policy placing emphasis on the impact of demographic changes.  The 
age specific relative profiles capture the present status quo of our fiscal policy; 
consequently, keeping the relative profiles unchanged, our fiscal policy remains 
unaltered through time.  Therefore, generational accounts extrapolate into the future 
by projecting all taxes and expenditure using both the relative profiles and the 
demographic projections. (Cardarelli, Gobat and Lee, 2000)  In fiscal projecting, 
government revenues and expenditures are regrouped into direct taxation/ spending 
(with demographic adjustments) and indirect taxation/ spending (without 
demographic adjustments).  The table below shows the grouping. 
TABLE 6.1: DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXATION AND SPENDING 
Direct (with demographic adj.) Indirect (without demographic adj.) 
Taxation Spending Taxation Spending 
Motor Vehicles Health Other Receipts Social Goods & 
Services 
Goods & Service 
(GST)  
Education  Stamp Duty Defense 
Income  Workfare Income 
Supplement 
Excise & Customs Baby Bonus 
  Betting  
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6.4 WITHOUT DEMOGRAPHIC ADJUSTMENTS 
For the variables within this category, we use a simple public good argument 
and assume that these variables increase at a labor productivity growth rate of g = 
0.016 for the medium projection scenario (g = growth rate thereafter).  High and low 
growth rates are set at 0.019 and 0.008 respectively.  Figure 6.2 graphs the path of 
productivity growth rate of Singapore since 1995.  The choice of the medium scenario 
growth rate is a conservative one.    
 
FIGURE 6.2: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE 
 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2006 (DOS) p48 
 
 
In Table 6.3, we show how adjustment for growth is done using income tax as 








TABLE 6.3 SHOWING ADJUSTMENT FOR GROWTH 
Years Income Tax (S$bil) Working 
2007 13.558  
2008 13.774928 =  13.558 (1+0.016)1 
2009 13.9953268 = 13.558 (1+0.016)2 
2010 14.2192521 = 13.558 (1+0.016)3 
2011 14.4467601 = 13.558 (1+0.016)4 
2012 14.6779083 = 13.558 (1+0.016)5 
2013 14.9127548 = 13.558 (1+0.016)6 
2014 15.1513589 = 13.558 (1+0.016)7 
2015 15.3937806 = 13.558 (1+0.016)8 
2016 15.6400811 = 13.558 (1+0.016)9 
Source: Figures from Budget Highlights for Financial Year 2007 
Note: For fiscal years 2004 to 2006 are actual figures. For FY 2007, figures are official projections 
from Ministry of Finance. Our projection builds from the 2007 official projection.  
  
  
6.5 WITH DEMOGRAPHIC ADJUSTMENTS 
As mentioned above, generational accounts extrapolate into the future by 
projecting all taxes and expenditure using age-specific relative profiles and 
demographic projections.  One assumption of generational accounts methodology is 
that present fiscal policy (represented by the age-specific relative profile) remains 
unaltered through time because the prime objective of generational accounts is to 
assess the sustainability of present fiscal policy across time.  Therefore, since our 
relative profiles i.e. present fiscal policy remains unchanged, the aggregate amounts 
of taxations and expenditure remain equal to those in 2004 with an adjustment for 
growth.  In addition, we further assume that apart from the adjustments for growth, 
aggregate amounts of tax and expenditure vary due to the changes in demographic 
structure i.e. aging population. (Cardarelli, Gobat and Lee, 2000).   
 
To illustrate the how changes in demographic structure is incorporated into the 
fiscal projection, we use education spending as an example.  After the adjustment for 
growth (column ‘education’ in Table 6.4), we adjust for changes in demographic 
structure to obtain column ‘educ final’ in Table 6.4.  Take for example, for FY2007, 
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we first multiply demographic projection with per person spending (male and female 
together from relative profile matrix) for all ages from 0 to 100.  We then sum across 
all ages to obtain an aggregated figure.  This step is repeated for all the years until 
2050 the end of our population projection years.  This will give us the column named 
‘Sum of N x, t*B x, t’ in Table 6.4 below (where N x, t is the number of people in age 
group x at time t and B x, t is the amount of benefit receivable for age group x at time 
t).  Subsequently, the ‘demographic adjustment’ figure for 2008 (1.018312091) is 
obtained by dividing 7063108134 by 6936093752.  This step is also then repeated for 
all the years until 2050.  Lastly, our adjusted education projection (‘educ final’) is 
obtained from the original ‘education’ column by multiplying it with the 
‘demographic adjustment’ column.   
 
Figure 6.5 shows the plot between the growth rate adjusted only ‘education’ 
column (in blue) with the growth and demographic adjusted column ‘educ final’ (in 
red).  From Figure 6.5, it is observed that as a result of decreasing fertility, from years 
2012 to 2027, the adjusted red line is actually below the blue line which indicates that 
due to fewer number of students, the total amount of spending on education decreases 
even as the per amount of student spent remains unchanged.  Subsequently, as 
assumed by the UN Population Prospects (refer to Chapter Five) that total fertility 
eventually converges to 1.85 woman per child, we observe that the gap between 








TABLE 6.4: DEMOGRAPHIC ADJUSTMENTS FOR EDUCATION 
Years Education  S$bil 




Educ final  
S$bil 
2004 6.214   6.214 
2005 6.082   6.082 
2006 6.966   6.966 
2007 7.034 6.936093752  7.034 
2008 7.146544 7.063108134 1.018312091 7.277412166 
2009 7.260888704 7.155750481 1.013116371 7.356125214 
2010 7.377062923 7.204252568 1.006778057 7.427065079 
2011 7.49509593 7.201098877 0.999562246 7.491814922 
2012 7.615017465 7.147784717 0.992596385 7.558638811 
2013 7.736857744 7.048058108 0.9860479 7.628912329 
2014 7.860647468 6.905667053 0.979797122 7.70183977 
2015 7.986417828 6.724359581 0.973745118 7.776735371 
2016 8.114200513 6.509465112 0.968042389 7.854890048 
2017 8.244027721 6.27263871 0.963618147 7.944094718 
2018 8.375932165 6.027116853 0.960858282 8.048083788 
2019 8.509947079 5.786136016 0.960017228 8.169695808 
2020 8.646106233 5.562932678 0.961424457 8.312577991 
2021 8.784443932 5.368628238 0.965071582 8.4776172 
2022 8.924995035 5.205883807 0.969686031 8.65444301 
2023 9.067794956 5.075245423 0.974905628 8.840244338 
2024 9.212879675 4.977259119 0.980693288 9.035009257 
2025 9.36028575 4.912470934 0.98698316 9.238444409 
2026 9.510050322 4.88058358 0.993508897 9.448319607 
2027 9.662211127 4.87792647 0.999455575 9.656950781 
2028 9.816806505 4.899985695 1.004522255 9.861200603 
2029 9.973875409 4.942247349 1.008624853 10.05989862 
2030 10.13345742 5.000197522 1.01172547 10.25227696 
2031 10.29559273 5.069627495 1.013885446 10.43855163 
2032 10.46032222 5.147549317 1.015370325 10.62110077 
2033 10.62768737 5.231280234 1.016266171 10.80055915 
2034 10.79773037 5.318137489 1.016603441 10.97700986 
2035 10.97049406 5.405438319 1.016415677 11.15058215 
2036 11.14602196 5.490488686 1.015734222 11.32139595 
2037 11.32435831 5.570549423 1.014581714 11.48948687 
2038 11.50554805 5.642870077 1.012982679 11.65492088 
2039 11.68963682 5.704700197 1.010957211 11.81772264 
2040 11.876671 5.753289329 1.008517386 11.97782919 
2041 12.06669774 5.786443297 1.005762611 12.13623343 
2042 12.2597649 5.804193029 1.003067468 12.29737134 
2043 12.45592114 5.807125718 1.000505271 12.46221476 
2044 12.65521588 5.795828572 0.998054606 12.6305965 
2045 12.85769934 5.770888784 0.995696942 12.80237191 
2046 13.06342252 5.732893555 0.993416053 12.97741364 
2047 13.27243729 5.682430088 0.991197557 13.15560742 
2048 13.48479628 5.620085577 0.989028548 13.33684848 
2049 13.70055302 5.546447227 0.98689729 13.52103865 
2050 13.91976187 5.462102234 0.984792969 13.70808362 
Source: Budget Highlights for Financial Year 2007 and Author’s own computation  
Note:  
1. Education: before demographic adjustment and Educ final: after demographic adjustment.  
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2. Figures for FY 2004 to 2006 are all actual figures. 2007 figure is the yearly official projection 




FIGURE 6.5: EDUCATION PROJECTION: BEFORE AND AFTER 
ADJUSTMENT 
 
Source: Budget Highlights for Financial Year 2007 and Author’s own computation  
Note: Education: before demographic adjustment and Educ final: after demographic adjustment 
 
 






















































































































Source: Budget Highlights for Financial Year 2007 and Author’s own computation  
Note: health: before demographic and medical inflation adjustment and health final: after demographic 


















2004 1.718 1.718   1.718 
2005 1.765 1.765   1.765 
2006 1.932 1.932   1.932 
2007 2.28 2.28 2.843190203  2.28 
2008 2.31648 2.36208 2.993191851 1.052758218 2.486699131 
2009 2.35354368 2.44711488 3.150461767 1.052542544 2.575692522 
2010 2.391200379 2.535211016 3.314417319 1.052041753 2.66714784 
2011 2.429459585 2.626478612 3.484722429 1.051383122 2.761435284 
2012 2.468330938 2.721031842 3.66202725 1.050880615 2.859479617 
2013 2.507824233 2.818988989 3.847228505 1.050573424 2.961554913 
2014 2.547949421 2.920472592 4.041222899 1.050424453 3.067735826 
2015 2.588716612 3.025609606 4.244907154 1.050401638 3.178105287 
2016 2.630136078 3.134531551 4.459729819 1.050607153 3.293161269 
2017 2.672218255 3.247374687 4.684315919 1.050358678 3.410908185 
2018 2.714973747 3.364280176 4.931427276 1.052752923 3.541755789 
2019 2.758413327 3.485394262 5.192079137 1.052855258 3.669615675 
2020 2.80254794 3.610868456 5.467163857 1.052981612 3.802178086 
2021 2.847388707 3.74085972 5.757777938 1.053156278 3.939709899 
2022 2.892946926 3.87553067 6.066590888 1.05363405 4.083391076 
2023 2.939234077 4.015049774 6.393319564 1.053857048 4.231288502 
2024 2.986261822 4.159591566 6.738957281 1.054062325 4.384468755 
2025 3.034042012 4.309336862 7.106160413 1.054489607 4.544150933 
2026 3.082586684 4.464472989 7.496870722 1.054981915 4.709938265 
2027 3.131908071 4.625194017 7.912474352 1.055436948 4.881600655 
2028 3.1820186 4.791701002 8.350412251 1.055347781 5.05691102 
2029 3.232930898 4.964202238 8.814441529 1.055569625 5.240061095 
2030 3.284657792 5.142913518 9.307340805 1.055919513 5.430502737 
2031 3.337212317 5.328058405 9.825787616 1.055703001 5.624847246 
2032 3.390607714 5.519868507 10.3701734 1.055403781 5.825690092 
2033 3.444857437 5.718583774 10.95212522 1.056117848 6.03949839 
2034 3.499975156 5.92445279 11.5684875 1.05627787 6.257868374 
2035 3.555974759 6.13773309 12.22772167 1.056985338 6.487493888 
2036 3.612870355 6.358691481 12.92444541 1.056979032 6.721003564 
2037 3.67067628 6.587604375 13.66111302 1.056998005 6.963084684 
2038 3.729407101 6.824758132 14.43978501 1.056999162 7.213763626 
2039 3.789077614 7.070449425 15.26288131 1.057001977 7.473479023 
2040 3.849702856 7.324985604 16.0725614 1.053048967 7.713568525 
2041 3.911298102 7.588685086 16.86678019 1.049414575 7.963676735 
2042 3.973878872 7.861877749 17.68628596 1.048586971 8.243862578 
2043 4.037460934 8.144905348 18.48849217 1.045357528 8.514338119 
2044 4.102060308 8.43812194 19.47595337 1.053409505 8.888797853 
2045 4.167693273 8.74189433 20.50474557 1.052823714 9.203673658 
2046 4.234376366 9.056602526 21.59548822 1.053194644 9.538365278 
2047 4.302126388 9.382640217 22.73831633 1.052919763 9.879167311 
2048 4.37096041 9.720415265 23.94171844 1.052923976 10.23485829 
2049 4.440895776 10.07035021 25.20900423 1.052932115 10.60339515 
2050 4.511950109 10.43288282 26.54366576 1.052943842 10.98523972 
Source: Ibid 
*Note: ‘health with medical inflation’ is after 2% points of adjustment and ‘health final’ contains the 
final figures after demographic adjustment. All figures in S$ billion  
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Lastly, with regards to health spending, it is assumed that health expenditure 
grows at 2 percentage points higher, i.e. 0.036, than normal growth rate of 0.016.  
This is incorporated because medical inflation is generally about 2 percentage points 
higher than normal inflation rate.  Thus, necessitating the need to reflect this 
phenomenon. After going through the similar adjustment as education described 
above, Figure 6.6 shows the adjustment for health.  As observed, health expenditure 
increases faster after population adjustment.  This reflects increasing demands for 
health expenditure in face of aging population.  
 
Tables 6.4 and 6.7 illuminated the demographic impact of ‘aging from the 
bottom’ mentioned in chapter three.  From Table 6.4, we observe that the impact of 
decreasing fertility results in ‘demographic adjustment’ column adjusting the 
education figures lower than the initial deterministic growth rate of 0.016.  This is 
shown by some figures in ‘demographic adjustment’ column having a less than 1 
ratio.  However, if we compare to Table 6.7, we note that the increasing number of 
aged people have the opposite impact.  ‘Health final’ column, after demographic 
adjustment ratios of approximately 1.05, shows a further upward increment after 
taking care of medical inflation.     
 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Fiscal projection is the last set of matrices we need for GA.  In chapter three, 
we have constructed the age specific relative profiles.  In chapters four and five, we 
built population projection for Singapore using the Leslie method.  In the chapter 
seven, we will present the results for the base case and six other scenarios.  
 
CHAPTER 7: GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS RESULTS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will discuss the simulated results for Singapore’s 
generational accounts.  A total of seven cases; one base case and six other scenarios 
will be presented. 
 
Before we go present Case One, we will specify two more parameters here.  
First, the base case interest rate (used for discounting) is set at 0.053 as the prime 
lending rate of ten leading banks in Singapore has been stable at 5.3% since 2001. 
(Yearbook of Statistics 2004, p188).  Next, we estimate the government net wealth (or 
net debt; component D in Equation 2.1).  For the case of Singapore, there is a lack of 
transparency on the government’s net asset position.  Therefore, we resort to the use 
of Statement of Assets and Liability published in Budget 2004/05 as estimation.  
There are two points to note.  First, only Government Security Fund is subtracted as a 
liability from the assets.  This is because all other ‘liabilities’ do not represent an 
explicit financial commitment.  They are inherently more like contingent funds.  
Secondly, as noted assets are reported in historical values, there is a potential of 
underestimation of the value of assets. (Cardarelli, Gobat and Lee, 2000).  The net 
asset position of Singapore stands at approximately S$214.9 billion (so government 
indebtedness, D = -S$214.9 billion).   
 
In our base case, we use the budget balance as defined by the Singapore 
government.  The Singapore budget accounting excludes non-operating revenue such 
as Net Investment Income (NII) and earnings from land sales.  This term in Singapore 
budget context is referred to as primary budget balance.  (Refer to Tables 7.1) 
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TABLE 7.1a: IMF VERSUS SINGAPORE BUDGET DEFINITION 






(-) Total Expenditure 
 
(-) Total Expenditure 
 
 
Overall budget position 
 
Primary budget position 
 
 (-) Special transfers 
(+) Net Investment Income Contribution (NIIC) 
 
 
 Overall budget position 
 
Source: Budget Highlights 2007 
 
 





When we determine intergenerational equity or inequity, we compare the 
generational accounts (GAs) of age ‘0’ cohort and that of future generation.  This is 
because GAs for each age represent the remaining lifetime net payment for each age 
cohort; it does not include the taxes paid or benefits received in the past.  Therefore 
for a fair comparison, we can only compare present newborns (age ‘0’ cohort) with 
the future generation.  
 
The program, following the methodology presented in chapter two by 
Auerbach et al. (1994), calculates the present value of remaining net tax payment of 
existing generation (A) first.  As shown in the inter-temporal budget constraint 
represented by Equation 2.1, the present value of the net tax payment of future 
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generation (B) is calculated as a residue once A, C and D are known.  Consequently, 
when we change government indebtedness (D), it will not affect A, the GA of present 
cohorts aged 0 to 90.    Intuitively, we know that generational accounts is calculated 
to evaluate the effect of present fiscal policy over time; i.e. the net burden on future 
generation given present revenue and spending patterns while taking into account 
government indebtedness.   Therefore net government indebtedness is taken into 
consideration only when calculating future GA.  (We reproduce the inter-temporal 


















         (2.1) 
 
            A                     +            B                     =            C                +           D 
Present value (PV) of          PV of net tax                PV of all future       government 
remaining net tax        +      payments of          =     government       +     net 
payments of existing           future generations        consumption            indebtedness 
generations 
 
7.2 A ROADMAP OF THE RESULTS  
The main motivation for presenting the following seven cases is to highlight 
the unique features of Singapore fiscal budget.  From our results, we reach a general 
conclusion that Singapore has a sound fiscal foundation.  Even under our conservative 
assumption of utilizing 0% net wealth, we show that Singapore can cover its 
expenditure on current generations without burdening the future generation if Net 
Investment Income Contribution (NIIC) is prudently capitalized upon.  Table 7.2 





TABLE 7.2: OVERVIEW OF THE SEVEN CASES 
Breakdown Description 
Case 1  100% net wealth 
Case 2 a 50% net wealth 
 b 0% net wealth (Base case)* 
Case 3  Removing Indirect Benefits  
(Defense and Social Goods & Services) 
Case 4  Results from 4a, 4b, 4c to compare with Case 2b 
 a 50% NII only 
 b 50% NII & receipts from land sales 
 c 100% NII & receipts from land sales 
Case 5  Higher education and health expenditure 
 a Case 5 + 50% NII only 
 b Case 5 + 50% NII & receipts from land sales 
 c Case 5 + 100% NII & receipts from land sales 
Case 6  Removing Immigration 
Case 7 a Changing ‘r’ 
 b Changing ‘g’ 
Source: Author 




In Case One, we present the conventional GA results as stipulated in chapter 
two.  In Case Two, we vary the amount of net wealth (component D) in the inter-
temporal budget constraint, Equation 2.1.  The motivation in this case comes from the 
fiscal prudent practices in Singapore.  Consequently, we introduce Case 2a (50% net 
wealth) and Case 2b (0% net wealth used).  As fiscal prudence is a hallmark of 
Singapore, Case 2b is a more probable scenario than Case One (100% net wealth).  
Under our conservative assumption, Case 2b is chosen as the base case.  To compare 
with our base case result, the subsequent case results are presented with 0% net 
wealth. (Cases with otherwise are labeled clearly) 
 
In Cases Three to Six, we illuminated several special features about the 
Singapore budget.  In Case Three, we showed that majority of our benefits are 
indirect benefits; thereby illuminating the fact that under the backdrop of aging 
population, Singapore is faced with a dual challenge of providing social safety nets 
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for the aged as a group and expenditure containment issues.  Following the concern 
that government may need to move in actively to build a more comprehensive system 
of social safety nets (in Case Three), Case Four gives us an idea as to the financing 
source for these new programs.  Case Four presents the effect on future generation 
when we incorporate non-operating revenue into the budget.  We present the results 
for three treatments of non-operating revenue in Cases 4a, 4b and 4c.  The motivation 
for Case Four comes from the special point that non-operating revenue to GDP ratio 
is high in Singapore as compared to OECD countries and there has been rising 
importance of non-operating revenue as fiscal cushion.  The breakdown of Case Five 
is similar to Case Four except in Case Five, we increase expenditure for health and 
education.  Case Six presents the results for no immigration.  Case Seven presents 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
7.3 CASE ONE—CONVENTIONAL GA RESULTS 
In Case One, we assume both medium population and fiscal projections are 
used.  The results are presented in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.4 below.  Most GA results 
will have designated this as the base case, consequently the yardstick from which all 
other scenarios are compared to.  However for the case of Singapore, the government 
has net wealth, as compared to net debt as in most OECD countries.  In this thesis, we 







TABLE 7.3 GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS (AGE SPECIFIC NET 
TAX/ BENEFIT PAYMENT) – CASE ONE 
 100% net wealth utilization 
Age Male Female Together 
 S$ US$ S$ US$ S$ US$ 
0 23.88 15.73 -57.25 -50.88 -16.85 -11.10 
5 39.22 25.83 -44.98 -29.63 -3.02 -1.99 
10 48.72 32.09 -22.79 -15.01 13.07 8.61 
15 78.82 51.92 13.87 9.14 47.43 31.24 
20 160.98 106.04 86.16 56.75 125 82.34 
25 235.11 154.86 133.86 88.17 186.41 122.79 
30 231.06 152.20 121.57 80.08 177.5 116.92 
35 168.52 111.00 78.80 51.90 123.12 81.10 
40 100.35 66.10 44.13 29.07 72.07 47.47 
45 52.84 34.81 18.59 12.25 35.77 23.56 
50 15.39 10.14 -3.12 -2.06 6.19 4.08 
55 -13.07 -8.61 -18.99 -12.51 -16.02 -10.55 
60 -29.19 -19.23 -30.6 -20.16 -29.89 -19.69 
65 -40.98 -26.99 -42.19 -27.79 -41.59 -27.39 
70 -43.94 -28.94 -44.78 -29.50 -44.38 -29.23 
75 -38.79 -25.55 -39.56 -26.06 -39.21 -25.83 
80 -35.95 -23.68 -37.04 -24.40 -36.57 -24.09 
85 -33.93 -22.35 -33.87 -22.31 -33.89 -22.32 
90 -27.02 -17.80 -22.98 -15.14 -24.42 -16.09 
       
Future -88.54 -58.32 -128.7 -84.77 -108.62 -71.55 
       
Intergenerational 
gap     -91.77  
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: all in thousands 
 
 
FIGURE 7.4: GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS – CASE ONE 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 7.3 presents the GA for each generation.  Each GA is an age specific net 
tax or benefit position that each age group will pay/ enjoy over its entire lifetime. A 
positive (negative) number means a net tax paying (benefit receiving) position.   The 
numbers are expressed in thousands of Singapore dollars unless otherwise stated.  
Therefore for the male age ‘0’ generation, the corresponding figure S$23.88 means 
that male residents age ‘0’ will need to pay a lifetime tax of S$23,880.  (as expressed 
in thousands of Singapore dollars).   
 
Future generation refers to any future generation that is born after 2004 where 
2004 is the year of reference (whereas current generations refer to any generation 
born at or before 2004).  Consequently, ‘future’ from Table 7.3 refers to net tax/ 
benefit for the generations born after 2004.  This number is the simulated result (B) 
from Equation 2.1.  Intergenerational gap is the difference between payment for the 
future and age ‘0’ cohorts.  
    
From Table 7.3, we observe that male residents have higher net tax than 
female residents for all working ages before the age of 55; after that, both male and 
female residents start to register a net benefit position in their accounts.  This trend is 
especially accentuated for the generation at 25 to 30 years old.  This is probably due 
to the fact that women after their marriage at late 20s are having their first child at 
early 30s thereby showing a trend of taking a break before returning to the workforce.  
In addition, generations aged 25 to 34 years old bear the greatest burden of our 
present fiscal policy as evident from Figure 7.4 where net tax peaks.  Subsequently, 
the decline of net tax seemed to be faster for male residents rather than female 
residents before both male and female elderly cohorts start to enjoy a net benefit.   
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From our results, we see that the future generations for both genders enjoy net 
benefits.  To understand this, we need to recall that, the GAs for future generation are 
obtained as a residue from B = C + D – A (Equation 2.1) after current generations 
paid their share of net tax (A).  Consequently, due probably to the sheer amount of net 
wealth the Singapore government has accumulated over time, future generation 
enjoys a net benefit.  This is in contrast to Case Two, where we assume different net 
wealth component (D).  However, for our current newborns or age ‘0’ cohorts, only 
the female residents enjoy a net benefit whereas male residents pay a net tax.  From 
the relative profile matrices, males pay higher taxes than females in all age specific 
taxes.  Thus male residents because of their higher tax paid relatively register a net tax 
position in their GA whereas female residents with lesser taxation pressure register a 
net benefit position.  This is because current income tax provisions allow only 
females to claim the enhanced child relief and foreign maid levy have significantly 
reduced the tax payable by females.      
 
7.4 CASE TWO: CHANGING NET WEALTH (D) 
(BASE CASE: CASE 2b -- 0% NET WEALTH) 
This case is considered because of the fiscal prudence stance of the Singapore 
government.  Even in the case where future generations register a net benefit 
indicating room for reduction of taxes, it is reasonable to assume that this will not 
happen easily for the simple reason that these accumulated net wealth are meant for 
contingent usage.  And to date, the past contingents like serious economic recessions 
in 1985 and 1997 are not considered critical enough to unlock the reserves.  
Consequently, it is not unreasonable to present the scenario where government only 
uses 50% (Case 2a) or 0% (Case 2b- Base Case) of the accumulated net wealth.   
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TABLE 7.5:  IMPACT ON FUTURE GENERATION WHEN CHANGING NET 
WEALTH (D) 
Cases  Male Female Together 
  Newborns 23.88 -57.25 -16.69 
1 100% net wealth  -88.54 -128.70 -108.62 
  Future    
2a 50% net wealth  15.19 12 13.60 
2b* 0% net wealth  149.28 119.42 134.35 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note:  
1. * base case  
2. all figures in S$ thousands 
 
 
FIGURE 7.6: IMPACT ON FUTURE GENERATION WHEN CHANGING 
NET WEALTH 
 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
As can be gleaned from Table 7.5, future generation will suffer when 50% of 
net wealth is removed from the intertemporal budget constraint.  Figure 7.6 shows a 
sudden jump from the net benefit region to the net tax region.  When 0% of net wealth 
is used, future male generation is affected most adversely; whereas future female 
generation (50% of net wealth used) is least affected.   
 
In a prudential light, this is perhaps a more realistic scenario for the GA of the 
future generation.  By looking at this result, we may perhaps jump into conclusion 
about intergenerational inequality and the need to alter our spending pattern.  
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However, in Cases Three, Four and Five, we will see that actually we need not be that 
concerned.   
 
7.5 CASE THREE: REMOVING INDIRECT BENEFITS 
 
Here we present the case where we remove defense and social goods and 
services expenditures from the benefits category.  The reason for this case comes 
directly from an interesting observation that even though government spends 
extensively on improving the living standard of Singaporeans such as improving 
public transport, upgrading HDB housing and protecting national sovereignty, it has 
an unfunded pension and limited medical subsidies.  As such, unlike most OECD 
countries, Singapore seldom intervenes directly in the areas of old age pension, 
unemployment benefit or health financing systems like USA’s Medicare.  Another 
feature of government’s spending is that it is targeted at expenditures that will 
facilitate future economic growth to enlarge the economic pie to benefit the whole 
population so rather than focusing on a specific group of people.  As such, we observe 
these spending tend to be more of an investment nature rather than a consumption 
nature.  Figure 7.7 shows that indirect benefits are the two largest spending 
components in the government budget.   Thus under this backdrop, it is interesting to 
know the effect of removing these two major components (defense and social goods 
and services).     
FIGURE 7.7: BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
 
Source: Budget highlights Financial Year 2007, Ministry of Finance p51 
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Table 7.8 presents the output of this simulation and in Figures 7.9 and 7.10 we 
compare the results with the base case separately for each gender and together.  As 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show similar trends, we will explain the results as one set of 
result.   
 
The overall observation for present generations is that the benefit level 
decreases.  For the younger generations (their GAs are net tax payments), it is 
observed that their net tax increase greatly (blue line above the pink line for Figures 
7.9 and 7.10).  This is because benefit component decreases; thereby resulting in an 
increment in net tax while tax remained unchanged.1  For the older generations (their 
GAs are net benefits), it is fairly evident that their overall positions are adversely 
affected given a reduction in net benefit receivable.  This highlights the fact that with 
a self-funded define contribution pension system and limited medical benefit, the bulk 
of benefits receivable over our lifetime are really indirect benefits.  In addition, when 
removing social goods and services and defense expenditures, we can see that the 
elderly as a group are not having much assistance targeted at their age groups.  Even 
though the government has, in 2006, Medisave top-ups and New Singapore shares, 
they are not reflected in GA for the reason that they are considered as ‘special 
transfers’ and by nature not considered as permanent.  And for the same reason, we 
cannot rely on these infrequent top-ups and consider this as a sustainable long-term 
benefit for the elderly.   
 
Comparing with GA for USA, (refer to Table 7.11 and Table 7.3) we observe 
that the US net payment figures are greater.  This is not a surprising observation 
because of their social security system (pay-as-you-go, PAYG system), the young 
                                                
1 net tax (↑) = tax-benefit (↓) 
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supports the benefits enjoyed by the older generation.  As a result, the residents pay 
much more taxes but in return, they enjoy more direct benefits.  The PAYG system 
has over time displayed a sustainability issue: there is little or no assurance that 
financial reserves will be adequate to cover future pension liabilities.  In anticipation 
of the pressure of aging population, the PAYG system is confronted with the 
formidable challenge of alleviating this demographic pressure.  To fully honor the 
obligations owing to the baby-boom generation, it is projected that a large percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would need to be diverted to finance the retirement 
benefits. Such a rate would be unsustainable by the financial system. (Tay, 2003 
p119)  Thus, GAs for OECD countries rightly focus on the concern whether there is 
intergenerational inequality and if there is a need to cut back on spending in 
preparation for aging population.  However, for Singapore we think there is a dual 
concern.   On top of the same concern as OECD countries, it should also be noted that 
this is a country with limited social safety net.  As such, GA is perhaps illuminative in 
shedding light on the need to provide these2 for the elderly (also) in preparation for 
aging population.    
 
Future generations however benefited tremendously from the reduction in 
current spending.3  In Figures 7.9 and 7.10, this is observed that future generation 
(blue line) move strongly into the benefit region.   
 
Going back to the concern raised in Case Two, we can see that we need not be 
that concerned about intergenerational inequality when government net wealth is not 
incorporated because the nature of the bulk of spending is investment rather than 
                                                
2 Perhaps in the form of a co-funded pension system 
3 PV Future GA net tax paid (↓) = - PV current GA net tax paid (↑)- net wealth + government 
consumption 
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consumption.  As such, investment goods have accrual returns, which are not taken 
into account of in GA simulations.  This issue will be discussed further in Case Four. 
 
TABLE 7.8: GA RESULTS -- REMOVING DEFENCE AND SOCIAL GOODS 
AND SERVICES EXPENDITURES 
 0% net wealth utilization 
Age Male Female Together 
0 180.47 107.11 143.79 
5 121.06 69.39 95.23 
10 120.19 70.45 95.32 
15 173.7 111.2 142.45 
20 262.73 192.23 227.48 
25 351.08 256.33 303.71 
30 347.02 241.58 294.30 
35 266.42 174.21 220.32 
40 175.26 118.18 146.72 
45 111.04 77.44 94.24 
50 59.65 42.26 50.955 
55 19.07 14.70 16.885 
60 0.10 1.37 0.735 
65 -12.15 -10.56 -11.36 
70 -20.73 -19.69 -20.21 
75 -19.48 -18.73 -19.11 
80 -20.53 -20.2 -20.37 
85 -20.59 -19.74 -20.17 
90 -16.27 -13.09 -14.68 
    
Future -166.65 -307.00 -236.83 
Source: Author’s computation 




FIGURE 7.9a: GA PLOT -- NO INDIRECT BENEFITS COMPARING WITH 
BASE CASE (MALE) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 





FIGURE 7.9b: GA PLOT - NO INDIRECT BENEFITS COMPARING WITH 
BASE CASE (FEMALE) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: female-(B) is the result from base case (female) 
 
FIGURE 7.10: GA – PLOT NO INDIRECT BENEFITS COMPARING WITH 
BASE CASE (TOGETHER) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: Together (B) is the result from base case (together) 
 
 
TABLE 7.11: USA GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS (PRESENT VALUES IN 
1998 US DOLLARS) 
Age Male Female 
0 122.1 61.1 
10 169.4 82.0 
20 238.2 109.4 
30 268.1 111.4 
40 236.9 77.8 
50 152.9 10.5 
60 10.8 -95.6 
70 -92.4 -135.9 
80 -83.6 -112.3 
90 -61.5 -74.3 
   
Future 142.5 71.3 
Source: Gokhale, Page, Potter & Sturrock, 2000; p294, table 1 
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7.6 CASE FOUR: DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF NET INVESTMENT 
INCOME CONTRIBUTION (NIIC) 
 
Case Four is motivated by two interesting observations.  The first is that 
although Singapore’s fiscal handle4 is comparable to the OECD countries, the 
composition of revenue is very different.  Tax revenues to GDP ratio is less that half 
of the OECD countries, non-tax revenue5 and non-operating revenue6 (mainly NII and 
receipts from sales of land) is notably higher. (2007 Budget Highlights)  As 
mentioned above, Singapore’s fiscal revenue excludes half of NII and receipts from 
sales of land (refer to Figure 7.12).  This led to IMF in 2005 to comment that 
‘government’s definition of Budget balance significantly underestimates the strength 
of Singapore’s fiscal position.’  (We will define NII and NIIC below.) 
 
FIGURE 7.12: GOVERNMENT REVENUE BREAKDOWN AT A 
GLANCE 
 
Source: Budget Highlights 2007 
 
Net Investment Income (NII) refers to the dividends, interest and other income 
received from investing Government’s reserves, as well as interest received from 
loans, after deducting expenses associated with investing and managing the reserves. 
                                                
4 total revenue in percent of GDP 
5 Operating revenue = tax revenue + non-tax revenue (mainly fees and charges) 
6 Total revenue = operating revenue + non-operating revenue 
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(Budget Highlights Financial Year 2007, p7)  Net Investment Income Contribution 
(NIIC), on the other hand, refers to part of NII (presently up to 50%) taken into the 
budget to augment government’s revenues and ensure a sustainable fiscal position 
 
 The second observation comes from the fact that NIIC is uniquely Singapore 
and over time, it has emerged as an imperative fiscal buffer. (Refer to Figure 7.13)  
Recent trend shows that government is running a slight budget deficit in its primary 
budget balance.7  It is through the inclusion of NIIC that augments the budget position 
to a minor surplus.   
 
FIGURE 7.13: OPERATING REVENUS, NIIC, TOTAL EXPENDITURE AND 
PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCE 
 
Source: Budget Highlights Financial Year 2007 p6 
 
Therefore from the above two observations, we are motivated to present 
scenarios in Case(s) Four (and Five).  Here, we do not debate which definitions of 
budget balance are more appropriate; we wanted to show the increasing importance of 
NIIC (and other capital receipts like receipts from land sales).  Sub-cases 4a, 4b and 
                                                
7 Primary budget position: operating revenue less total expenditure (before less: special transfers and 
NIIC). It measures the ability of government to meet its annual operating and development 
expenditures through its regular collection of taxes, fees and charges. (Budget Highlights FY 2007, p6) 
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4c are all simulated in the absence of net government wealth; therefore comparable to 
the base case.  For the ease of reference, we present the scenarios in Table 7.14.   
 
TABLE 7.14: BREAKDOWN OF CASES FOUR AND FIVE 
Case 4 Case 5 
 Compare with base case 
 (Case 2b-- 0% wealth) 
5 Higher expenditure on health 
and education (Table 7.14) 
4a 50% NII only 5a Case 5 + 50% NII only 
4b 50% NII & receipts from land 5b Case 5 + 50% NII & receipts 
from land 





TABLE 7.15: IM PACT ON FUTURE GENERATIONS - ADDING CAPITAL 
RECEIPTS (CASE FOUR) 
Cases  Male Female Together 
  Newborns 23.88 -57.25 -16.69 
1 100% net wealth  -88.54 -128.70 -108.62 
      
2a 50% net wealth  15.19 12 13.60 
2b* 0% net wealth  149.28 119.42 134.35 
  Future    
4a 50% NII  -33.99 -49.4 -41.7 
4b 50% NII + Land 
sales receipt 
 
 -147.05 -213.74 
 
-180.40 
4c 100% NII + Land 
sales receipt 
 
 -217.62 -316.31 
 
-266.97 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: all figures in S$ thousands; Case 4a, 4b, and 4c -- 0% net wealth utilization 
* base case 
 
In Case Four, we bring in different treatments of non-operating revenue into 
the fiscal budget with zero percent net wealth utilization under normal spending 
setting.  Case 4a is motivated from the fact that government, constrained by 
constitution, is only allowed to use up to 50% of NII earned from past reserves for 
current expenditure needs.  Case 4b further includes receipts from land sales and Case 
4c encompasses full NII and receipts from land sales.  We then compare the results 
from Sub-cases 4a, 4b and 4c to that of Case 2b (base case) to obtain Table 7.15.  As 
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compared from base case, we can see that as soon as 50% of NII is added (Case 4a), 
future generation enjoys a net benefit.    
 
 
7.7 CASE FIVE: HIGHER HEALTH AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
 
Case Five presents the likely scenario that government incurs higher education 
and health expenditure.  In Table 7.16, we observe that the young ages of 25 to 34 
years old continue to bear the greatest burden of the fiscal policy.  However as 
compared to Case 2b (base case), age 0 generation for both male and female now 
enjoy a net benefit and the net benefit level enjoyed by the older generations increase.  
When we turn to future generation, we see that using 100% net wealth is not 
illuminative.  Contrary to that, when we totally exclude net wealth (using 0% net 
wealth for comparison), we note that future generation suffers as a result of increased 
spending.   
TABLE 7.16: CASE FIVE—GA RESULTS FOR HIGHER EXPENDITURE 
ON HEALTH & EDUCATION 
 100% net wealth utilization 0 % net wealth utilization 
Age Male Female Male Female 
0 -65.58 -145.48 -65.58 -145.48 
5 -20.73 -75 -20.73 -75 
10 12.25 -39.31 12.25 -39.31 
15 67.85 2.85 67.85 2.85 
20 152.07 76.25 152.07 76.25 
25 225.72 123.17 225.72 123.17 
30 222.38 111.97 222.38 111.97 
35 161.67 71.67 161.67 71.67 
40 95.28 38.69 95.28 38.69 
45 48.78 14.05 48.78 14.05 
50 12.06 -7.00 12.06 -7.00 
55 -15.75 -22.28 -15.75 -22.28 
60 -32.05 -34.09 -32.05 -34.09 
65 -43.70 -45.50 -43.70 -45.50 
70 -45.85 -46.98 -45.85 -46.98 
75 -40.12 -41.06 -40.12 -41.06 
80 -36.84 -37.99 -36.84 -37.99 
85 -34.46 -34.39 -34.46 -34.39 
90 -27.31 -23.13 -27.31 -23.13 
     
Future -126.67 -179.14 181.57 142.45 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note:  
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1. male-100% (0%) and female-100% (0%) is where 100% (0%) of net wealth used 




TABLE 7.14: BREAKDOWN OF CASES FOUR AND FIVE 
Case Four Case Five 
 Compare with base case 
 (Case 2b-- 0% wealth) 
5 Higher expenditure on health 
and education (Table 7.14) 
4a 50% NII only 5a Case 5 + 50% NII only 
4b 50% NII & receipts from land 5b Case 5 + 50% NII & receipts 
from land 




From the GA results in Table 7.16, we observe intergenerational inequity as 
future generation has a net tax payment while the age ‘0’ cohort enjoys net benefits.  
We then factor in different treatments of capital income as done in Case Four.  With 
the same breakdown, we present effects on future generation for Sub-cases 5a, 5b and 
5c in Table 7.17.  When we add in 50% of NII (Case 5a, Table 7.17), we note that 
future generation is still in a net tax payment position.  However as soon as receipts 
from land sales are added (Case 5b), future generation enjoys net benefits.   
 
TABLE 7.17: IMPACT ON FUTURE GENERATION - ADDING CAPITAL 
RECEIPTS (CASE FIVE) 
Cases  Male Female Together 
5  Newborns -65.58 -145.48 -105.53 
 100% net wealth  -126.67 -179.14 -152.05 
      
 0% net wealth  181.57 142.45 162.01 
      
5a 50% NII Future 5.51 4.41 4.96 
5b 50% NII + Land 
sales receipt 
 
 -110.69 -156.54 
 
-133.62 
5c 100% NII + Land 
sales receipt 
 
 -182.36 -257.91 
 
-220.14 
Source: Author’s computation 




In Budget 2007, government has indicated an interest to broaden the definition 
of NII to include capital receipts – profits from selling assets (e.g. land sales) - as part 
of total returns earned on top of the included dividends and interest.  This has differed 
from government’s stand in the past of taking land receipts as just transformation of a 
land into cash i.e. they are not capital gains and hence not included in government’s 
revenue.  This implies that NIIC (the ‘new’ 50% usable) would be significantly more 
imperative in future budget.  This move comes as Singapore prepares to further cut 
corporate taxes to improve tax competitiveness and spends more on social support 
schemes.    
 
From Cases Four and Five, we show that the increasing importance of NIIC 
(whether it is our present 50% NII Cases 4a, 5a or proposed modification of NIIC in 
2007 Budget – Cases 4b or 5b) as fiscal cushion is not exaggerated.  Taking into 
account government’s move in Budget 2007, we further show that if they are 
capitalized upon prudently, without touching accumulated reserves, the government 
need not burden the future generation as they have ample rooms for either wider 
social safety nets or tax cuts (or both).  Thus providing a possible financial source for 
the observation in Case Three that government may need to move in actively to target 
aged residents as a group. 
 
Going back to the view that Singapore government exercises extreme fiscal 
prudence with regards to the treatment of NII and receipts from land sales.  Singapore 
includes half of NII but excludes revenues from land sales, hence an underestimation 
of its fiscal strength.  Also the recent Parliamentary debate when Prime Minister Lee 
defended using half of NII as ‘striking a fair balance between the claims of the present 
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and the future, and help protect Singapore’s reserves from being depleted’.  From our 
simulation results in Cases Four and Five, we observe that future generations enjoy 
net benefits in their GA before full utilization of non-operating revenue (Cases 4c and 
5c).   Therefore prudent allocation of non-operating revenue between current and 
future budget commitments to achieve spending efficiency is indeed an issue.  Our 
results show that with if present spending pattern prevail, 50% NII is indeed sufficient 
to alleviate the burden on future generation (Results from Case 4a; Table 7.15).  
When there are intentions to increase spending, then 50% NII is not enough (results 
from Case 5a; Table 7.17); however, the inclusion of receipts from land sales (results 
from Case 5b; Table 7.17) will be sufficient.   
 
7.8 CASE SIX: NO IMMIGRATION 
Immigration has always been an imperative source of talent and labor to 
Singapore work force.  Therefore, a scenario is created to answer: what if Singapore 
becomes a closed society from 2004 onwards.  In Table 7.18, we present the result of 
the simulation and in Figures 7.19, 7.20 and 7.21 we compare the results of Case Six 
to that of the base case (Case 2b).   
 
As Figures 7.19, 7.20 and 7.21 show a similar trend we will discuss the results 
together.  The most apparent observation is that young adults of the cohort aged 25 to 
34 continue to bear the greatest burden of present fiscal policy.  The same age groups 
without immigration are also paying more net tax compared to with immigration 
(base case result).  The explanation here is rather simple, though Singapore’s 
immigration is liberal; it is biased towards the young adults – a measure taken for a 
long time to attract the talented in hope of improving growth prospects.  In face of 
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current shift in demographic structure, immigration is further welcomed to alleviate 
the pressures of aging population 
 
TABLE 7.18: GA RESULTS - NO IMMIGRATION 
 0% net wealth utilization 
Age Male Female Together 
0 39.53 -34.76 2.385 
5 45.18 -25.61 9.785 
10 65.09 -12.34 26.375 
15 108.36 47.01 77.69 
20 189.16 134.61 161.89 
25 278.91 172.45 225.68 
30 364.49 182.01 273.25 
35 204.28 128.23 166.26 
40 154.65 60.04 107.35 
45 73.47 38.02 55.75 
50 45.57 9.63 27.6 
55 -15.78 -12.62 -14.2 
60 -21.45 -25.09 -23.27 
65 -32.52 -30.21 -31.37 
70 -37.5 -31.03 -34.27 
75 -31.23 -31.2 -31.22 
80 -25.99 -29.17 -27.58 
85 -19.53 -26.01 -22.77 
90 -24.48 -16.98 -20.73 
    
Future 172.74 138.2 155.47 
Source: Author’s computation 





FIGURE 7.19: GA PLOT - NO IMMIGRATION COMPARING WITH BASE 
CASE (MALE) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 







FIGURE 7.20: GA PLOT - NO IMMIGRATION COMPARING WITH BASE 
CASE (FEMALE) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 







FIGURE 7.21: GA PLOT - NO IMMIGRATION COMPARING WITH BASE 
CASE (TOGETHER) 
 
Source: Author’s computation 



















7.9 CASE SEVEN: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This case is motivated because of the criticism that GA is highly sensitive to 
the choice of interest rate (used for discounting) and growth rate.  In Case 7a, we vary 
interest rate and in Case 7b we alter growth rate.   
 
7.9.1 Case 7a: Changing interest rate, r 
 
TABLE 7.22: EFFECT OF CHANGING INTEREST RATE ‘r’ ON GA 
 r= 0.013 r = 0.033 r = 0.053 (B) r = 0.073 r = 0.093 r = 0.123 
Age       
0 309.3 104.09 -7.36 -52.73 -66.26 -64.13 
5 176.55 68.59 0.8 -32.15 -45.73 -49.79 
10 152.04 74.39 18.27 -13.84 -30.66 -40.9 
15 194.02 122.04 62.61 23.56 -0.64 -20.35 
20 260.96 199.51 141.34 98.43 68.52 39.96 
25 301.53 255.94 204.83 163.14 131.54 98.47 
30 250.15 228.58 195.63 165.4 140.56 112.5 
35 153.88 152.02 138.18 122.69 108.57 91.21 
40 78.18 86.1 83.85 78.36 72.2 63.58 
45 29.61 41.7 45.38 45.48 44.08 41.05 
50 -5.82 7.46 14.03 17.25 18.76 19.42 
55 -29.35 -17.02 -9.81 -5.42 -2.64 -0.18 
60 -45.74 -32.44 -23.83 -18.04 -14.01 -9.98 
65 -57.76 -44.65 -35.52 -28.96 -24.1 -18.89 
70 -56.04 -46.5 -39.46 -34.13 -30.01 -25.38 
75 -47.36 -40.33 -34.92 -30.69 -27.31 -23.4 
80 -42.02 -36.96 -32.88 -29.54 -26.78 -23.45 
85 -36.72 -33.45 -30.7 -28.36 -26.36 -23.85 
90 -24.92 -23.36 -21.99 -20.78 -19.7 -18.3 
       
Future 442.3 174.54 -6.01 -137.19 -250.92 -417.52 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note:  
1. (B) means base case interest rate  
2. All figures in S$ thousands 
 
 
FIGURE 7.23: EFFECT OF CHANGING ‘r’ 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
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From Figure 7.23 we notice that the results from GA are truly sensitive to 
changes in interest rates.  By choosing only some age cohorts to plot, we show that 
for generations currently paying net tax (age 0: blue, age 25: brown & Future: green), 
their plots generally show an improvement in net position towards the net benefit 
region.  This is most apparent for the future generation (Green line). However for the 
generations currently receiving net benefits (represented by age 70 cohort: red line), 
their positions worsen.   
 
7.9.2 Case 7b: Changing productivity growth rate, g 
 
TABLE 7.24: EFFECT OF CHANGING ‘g’ ON GA RESULTS 
 g=0.006 g=0.016* g=0.026 g=0.03 g=0.04 g=0.05 g=0.06 g=0.07 
Age         
0 -6.84 -7.36 -7.95 -8.21 -8.94 -9.77 -10.74 -11.86 
25 204.83 204.83 204.83 204.83 204.83 204.83 204.83 204.83 
50 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 
70 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 -39.46 
90 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 -21.99 
Future -15.93 -6.01 3.74 7.57 16.92 25.7 33.4 39.04 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: 
1. * is base case 
2. all figures in S$ thousands 
 
FIGURE 7.25: EFFECT OF VARYING ‘g’ 
 
Source: Author’s computation  
 
 
When we vary the productivity growth rate, g, we also observe 2 effects.  For 
the future generation (pink line), increasing ‘g’ tend to worsen their position fairly 
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quickly.  For the current newborns (blue line), increasing ‘g’ improves their net 
position, though the effect as compared to future generation is rather minimum.   
 
From Case Seven, the point to note is that GA results are indeed sensitive to 
the choice of interest rates and growth rates.  Though this is admittedly a shortcoming 
of GA, we observe that the problem of the choice of interest rates is an on-going 
debate in Economics.  Therefore this debate is unavoidable and inevitable.   
 
7.10 SUMMARY OF GA RESULTS: IMPACT ON FUTURE GENERATION 
 
TABLE 7.26: SUMMARY-- IMPACT ON FUTURE GENERATION 
  Assumptions Male Female 
Case 1  100% net wealth -88.54 -128.70 
Case 2a  50% net wealth 15.00 12.00 
Case 2b Base 0% net wealth 149.28 119.42 
Case 3  Removing indirect benefits -166.65 -307.00 
Case 4  (Compare with base case-  
Case 2b 0% net wealth) 
  
 4a 50% NII only -33.99 -49.40 
 4b 50% NII & receipts from land 
sales 
-147.05 -213.74 
 4c Full NII & receipts from land 
sales 
-217.62 -316.31 
Case 5  Higher expenditure on health 
and education 
181.57 142.45 
 5a Case 5 + 50% NII only 5.51 4.41 
 5b Case 5 + 50% NII & receipts 
from land sales 
-110.69 -156.54 
 5c Case 5 + Full NII & receipts 
from land sales 
-182.36 -257.91 
Case 6  Without Immigration 172.74 138.20 
Source: Author’s computation 











TABLE 7.27: SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM SEVEN CASES 
Case 1: 100% net wealth – conventional GA 
Future generation is net benefit receiving – probably due to the sheer amount of net 
wealth accumulated                                         
                                                 
Case 2: Removing net wealth 
Causes Generational inequity 
Question: Is there a need to alter spending?                       
                            
Case 3: Removing Indirect benefits: Defense and Social Goods & Services  
Dual concerns for Singapore in preparation for demographic transition 
1. Achieve efficiency for spending  
2. Need to build up comprehensive set of social safety nets for elderly 
 
Cases 4 and 5 provide possible financial source for increased spending  
 
Case 4: Including different treatments of non-operating income 
Our results show that with if present spending pattern prevail, 50% NII is indeed 
sufficient to alleviate the burden on Future generation (Results from Case 4a; Table 
7.15)                      
 
Case 5: Higher healthcare and education expenses 
With different treatments of non-operating income:  
 
When there are intentions to increase spending, then 50% NII is not enough (results 
from Case 5a; Table 7.17); however, the inclusion of receipts from land sales (results 
from Case 5b; Table 7.17) will be sufficient.  
 
From Cases 4 and 5, we show that the increasing importance of NIIC (whether it is 
our present 50% NII Cases 4a, 5a or proposed modification of NIIC in 2007 Budget – 
Cases 4b or 5b) as fiscal cushion is not exaggerated.   
 
We further show that if they are capitalized upon prudently, without touching 
accumulated reserves, the government need not burden the future generation as there 
are ample rooms for either wider social safety nets or tax cuts (or both).  Thus 
providing a possible financial source for the observation in Case 3 that government 
may need to move in actively to target aged residents as a group. 
 
Case 6: Immigration 
Same age groups without immigration pay more tax 
Immigration could be one method to alleviate the pressures from aging population 
 
Case 7: Sensitivity analysis 
GA results are sensitive to choice of interest rate ‘r’ and growth rate ‘g’ 
 




With our society rapidly aging, we are confounded with new challenges that 
will in time cause great strain on our present system unless some preparations are 
made in advance.  The issue of sustainability of the fiscal policy highlights the fact 
that government cannot continue to finance spending or current public debts through 
the accumulation of more debts.  Generational accounting being one of the tools 
developed to assist decision makers in recognizing intergenerational inequity will 
thereby act as a signal for the need to adjust both taxation and expenditure patterns to 
better meet the challenges as the baby-boom generation move into old age.   
 
In chapter two, we cover the methodology of generational accounting.   
Following the recognition that fiscal policy is dynamic and cannot be accurately 
studied in a static timeframe, generational accounts employ the time dimension by 
introducing the inter-temporal budget constrain and the present value concept makes 
the ‘dollars’ over time comparable.  This incorporates the zero-sum nature of fiscal 
policy and indicates that government cannot go on with Ponzi financing.  Following 
the tricky task of assigning taxes or transfers, generational accounting is refined by 
reflecting only net taxes.    
 
In chapters three, four, five and six, we start presenting the matrices necessary 
for the Matlab program to run.  In chapter three, we build the relative profiles for both 
genders separately and together.  Given that the relative profiles are illuminations of 
our present fiscal policy, by letting relative profiles remain unaltered over time, it 
reflects the underlying motivation of GA: given that present fiscal policy remains 
unchanged, what is its effect over time.  Our relative profile shows that male cohorts 
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of ages 25 to 34 bear the greatest tax burden whereas female elderly enjoy the most 
benefit.   
 
Chapters four and five are for demographic projections.  Chapter four 
introduces the life table, which forms the basis for Leslie method of population 
projection.  From the life table, we show that the male and female life expectancy is at 
78 and 83 years old respectively.  This is high even in international standard.  This 
highlights our present and future predicaments that not only are the number of aged 
population increasing; they are also going to live for a longer period of time.  Chapter 
five discusses the Leslie method of population projection.  We use Leslie projection 
results for a closed economy.  To feature immigration, we use the data released by 
United Nations.   
 
We presented fiscal projection in chapter six.  In this chapter, we further 
divide all taxes and benefits into direct and indirect categories.  Items in the indirect 
category increase deterministically with a growth factor ‘g’.  Whereas the items in the 
direct category are adjusted for demographic changes after growth adjustments.   
 
In chapter seven, we present one base case and six other scenarios.  Case One 
result shows that males bear more taxes than females and the male cohorts of ages 25 
to 29 and 30 to 34 will bear the greatest burden of present fiscal policy.  The females 
on the whole pay lesser taxes but enjoy greater benefits.  Future generation, because 
of the sheer amount of accumulated government wealth, enjoys a net benefit position.  
Case Two shows that with 50% (Case 2a) or 0% (Case 2b – Base Case) net wealth 
utilization, future generation needs to pay net tax.  When we remove defense and 
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social goods & services in Case Three, it shows that the benefit level of old 
generations decreases.  This illuminates the concern that (in addition to the need of 
monitoring spending) government should perhaps move in to provide some form of 
social safety net for older generations in preparation for aging population.  In Case 
Four, we add in NIIC and highlight that NIIC’s importance as a fiscal cushion is 
likely to persist.  Case Five shows that higher education and health expenditure will 
benefit current cohorts and adversely affect future generation. More importantly, from 
Cases Four and Five, we show that if government capitalizes on NIIC prudently, 
Singapore can more than maintain intergenerational equity leaving ample rooms for 
fiscal expenditure maneuver.  Case Six brings us back to the familiar discussion on 
immigration.  Our result shows that immigration targeted at bringing in young talents 
can ease the burden of aging population on our work force.  Case Seven is motivated 
by the criticism that GA is sensitive to the choice of the interest rate ‘r’ and growth 
rate ‘g’.  It is shown that this is indeed the case.  However, we conclude that this 
debate is inevitable as the problem persist in the Economic discipline as a whole.   
 
Generational accounting provides a novel way of looking at our fiscal policy 
and assists in the task of recognizing intergeneration inequity in our system; it serves 
as a useful litmus test on our system.  However, it is not without its faults as presented 
on Case Seven of chapter seven.  Therefore the move has been to proceed with 
National Transfer Accounts.   
 
   
     
Data Sources 
 
Accountant General’s Department, Singapore, The Budget for the Financial Years 
1990 to 2006 Cmd. 3  
 
Department of Statistics, Singapore, (various years) Year Book of Statistics  
 
Department of Statistics, Singapore (2000) Census of population 2000 (various titles) 
 
Department of Statistics, Singapore Population Trends 2005 & 2006, Website: 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/people.html#demo  
 
Financial Statements for 2004/05 Cmd 7 of 2005 Presented to Parliament by 
command of the President of Republic of Singapore ordered by Parliament to lie upon 
the table: 1 June 2005 
 
Housing Development Board of Singapore (2005) Public Housing in Singapore: 
Residents’ Profile & Physical Aspects: HDB sample household survey 2003 (HDB 
Research section) 
 
Housing Development Board of Singapore (2005) Public Housing in Singapore: 
Social Aspects & The Elderly: HDB sample household survey 2003 (HDB Research 
section) 
 
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) Individual Income Tax website: 
http://www.iras.gov.sg/EVSPortal/ct/pfv/ct_b.2.2_what+are+the+tax_rates 
 
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (2005) Annual Report (containing 2004 
figures) 
 
Ministry of Education (2004) Annual Report Education Statistics Digest Website: 
http://www.moe.edu.sg  
 
Ministry of Finance (2004) Income tax breakdown, website: 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2004  
 
Ministry of Health http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/publications/statistics 
 
Ministry of Manpower (2004) Annual Report Report on Labor Forces in Singapore, 
website: http://www.mom.gov.sg/ManpowerResearchNStatistics 
 
Singapore Budget 2007 http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2007/index.html  
 
U.S. Census Bureau, International Program Centre 
http://www.census.gov/icp/www/idbnew/html  
 
United Nations Population Division World Prospect Series: 2004 revision Population 
database http://esa.un.org/unpp/  
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World Bank, World Development Indicators HNPStats Online Database 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/dp.asp   
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